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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Problem: Informal Authorities and Conflict Resolution 
Since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, conflict and war have become 
central to policy discourses on development. The re-discovery of intra-state, ‘ethnic’, 
‘religious’, and ‘communal’ conflicts has led policy makers to realise that sustainable 
development is impossible in the face of violent conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 7). However, 
acknowledging interdependence between security and development does not imply that 
existing policy approaches in the two areas can simply be merged. Superimposing 
development approaches on conflict can lead to a ‘de-politisation’ of conflict and an over-
reliance on ‘technocratic’ conflict solutions (Jönsson 2006: 4); designing development policy 
through the lens of national security risks ignoring the moral universality of individual rights 
to development. Therefore, an alternative theoretical frame is needed that acknowledges the 
links between development and violent conflict, as well as their particularities.  
This thesis explores theories from the fields of conflict studies and conflict resolution 
as a way of addressing a particular aspect of the link between conflict and development: the 
mechanisms through which violent conflict can be prevented or transformed into a 
constructive process of social change. While conflict studies during the Cold War emphasised 
the importance of the state and military in inter-state wars, conflicts during the past two 
decades have indicated the importance of analysis at the sub-national and regional level. 
Many of the most violent struggles in the 1990s and early 21st century were social conflicts 
between sub-national groups, defined in terms of an ethnic or religious social identity. 
Informal authorities, such as traditional rulers, religious authorities, and ethnic leaders, are the 
representatives of these identity groups, and are crucial to both the construction and resolution 
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of conflicts. The research problem of this thesis is therefore to uncover the mechanisms and 
processes through which informal authorities affect and resolve social conflict.  
 
1.2 The Case: Conflict in Kano, Nigeria 
To this end, this thesis provides an exploratory case study of the role of informal authorities in 
conflict resolution in Kano3, the commercial and industrial heart of northern Nigeria. Kano is 
the major urban centre in the Sudanic region of West-Africa, with a long-standing reputation 
as a commercial hub in the trans-Saharan and Sahelian trading routes, supporting a population 
of 5 million4. Kano is built around Kano City (birni), the walled part of city that is home to 
the Emir’s palace, the central mosque, and the famous kurmi market. Kano City is inhabited 
almost exclusively by indigenous Hausa Muslims (Kanawa); neighbourhoods outside the 
walls (waje) also host northern and southern economic migrant communities. As well as for 
its bustling trade, Kano is renowned for its radicalism both in politics and in Islamic affairs. In 
2000, Kano became one of the twelve states that implemented Sharia, or Islamic law, and the 
Governor has recently begun incorporating the Hisbah Guards5 into the state structure.  
 Kano has a history of recurrent riotous violence. As Wakili (1997: 235; 2005: 45) 
shows, Kano experienced eleven large-scale riots between the crises of the Hausa-Igbo riots 
in 1953 and the Plateau riot in 2004; eight occurred in the second half of that period. There 
are many views on the causes of this historical tradition of violence: some regard the riots as 
‘hijackings’ of an essentially peaceful Kano by ‘hooligans’ and ‘foreign elements’; others 
point to socio-economic and political causes and ethnic or religious manifestations. Since the 
implementation of Sharia, the international media, as well as intelligence analysts, have linked 
                                                
3 See map 1 and appendix C. 
4 Based on the 2006 census estimate of 9.4 million for Kano state and a conservative estimate of 50% 
urbanisation. 
5 The function of Hisbah has been outlined as follows: “to uphold justice and equality, uphold brotherhood of 
faith, advocate against interest, usury, hoarding and speculations, to encourage deeds of charity, advocate on the 
importance of marriage institution and redeem the institution from western influence, preach kindness to animals 
and to advocate for quest for knowledge” (Gwarzo, 2003: 305). 
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the city’s recurrent violence to ‘global struggles’ between Islam and the West, and more 
specifically to al-Qaeda terrorism (Pham 2007; Schwartz 2005). Although there are, 
occasionally, small groups of militant youths who refer to themselves as ‘Taleban’ or 
‘Mujahid’, this thesis will show that social conflict in Kano and the violent riots of 2004 can 
be explained in terms of local oppositions between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ – and should be 
addressed accordingly. 
 
1.3 The Argument: Root Causes, Discourse, and Exclusionary Identities 
One’s understanding of the process of conflict resolution depends on the nature of the model 
that is used for conflict analysis. Social conflict, as used in this thesis, is a socially constructed 
struggle between social groups that define themselves in terms of shared identities. In 
analysing the causes of such conflict, there is an inherent tension between ‘objective’ factors 
and social constructions. As Bourdieu (1985: 727) argues, both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
factors affect perceptions, processes of group formation, and group relations. In the 
framework of social conflict, this thesis proposes that social identities mediate between the 
two. Conflict is thus constructed through the process of social identity formation, which is 
affected by ‘objective’ root causes as well as by discursive structures. In the context of Kano, 
the dominant categories underlying the conflict are those of ‘native’ and ‘settler’, complex 
constructions that comprise meanings of ethnicity, religion, class and ‘legal indigeneity. 
These categories are rooted in history, but have been hardened by contemporary ‘root causes’, 
such as the exacerbation of horizontal inequalities6 between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ during the 
economic crises from the 1970s. 
Violence is considered analytically distinct from conflict. Conflict per se is neither 
negative nor positive; it becomes destructive only through its extension to violence. This 
                                                
6 See section 2.2. 
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thesis will take the riot of May 2004, which occurred in reaction to the killings of Hausa 
Muslims in Plateau state7, and the non-violent escalation in reaction to the Danish cartoons of 
the Prophet Muhammad in early 2006, and seek to explain the variance in the level of 
violence between these cases. It argues that the May 2004 protest was violent because patterns 
of justification and mobilisation developed within the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ categories, the 
framework of social conflict. Conversely, the public reaction to the cartoon crisis in 2006 was 
non-violent because the discourses during the escalation process allowed for inclusive 
justifications and mobilisation across the ‘native’-‘settler’ divide. Collective violence in riots 
is thus dependent on the discourses that frame it. 
Conflict resolution is the transformation of destructive and violent conflict processes 
into constructive social change. This can include dispute settlement mechanisms, such as 
mediation, arbitration, or reconciliation, and more structural peacebuilding measures. 
Although dispute settlement mechanisms have a rationalist bias, in the sense that they assume 
identifiable conflict parties with distinct interests and purposes, the concept of peacebuilding 
allows for a ‘deeper’ interpretation of conflict resolution and the integration of development 
into the process. Peacebuilding aims to eliminate the ‘root causes’ of conflict, to address 
‘objective’ factors that have hardened social identity boundaries. Development and conflict 
resolution overlap where these ‘root causes’ correspond with development goals. In the 
context of these social processes, informal authorities are conflict actors whose roles and 
functions are structured by their ‘objective’ characteristics, existing conflict resolution 
discourses, and specific historically-contingent factors.  
The influence of informal authorities is limited by many factors, most notably their 
lack of executive powers. However, because of their embeddedness within their communities 
and the moral and spiritual authority that their constituencies grant them, they have 
                                                
7 See appendix C for a map of Nigeria. 
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considerable influence over people’s perceptions and the discourses that frame them. Within 
these boundaries of ‘objective’ factors and discursive structures, informal authorities are 
provided with a space for agency that allows for constructive conflict resolution, rather than 
violence.   
 
1.4 The Structure of this Thesis 
This argument will be presented as follows. Chapter 2 will outline the theoretical background 
of this thesis and position it within the wider literature on conflict resolution. Chapter 3 will 
present three types of informal authorities in Kano – traditional rulers, religious leaders, and 
ethnic and community leaders – and discuss how their organisational structure, societal 
functions, historical transformation, and basis of authority impact on their role in conflict 
processes. Subsequently, chapter 4 will discuss the social conflict in Kano and address the 
complexity of its central parameters, ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, mainly using the data collected 
through the CRISE Perceptions Survey (PS). It will trace the historical process of the 
construction of these categories and outline the contemporary ‘root causes’ affecting this 
process. Chapter 5 will then present the two case studies of escalation, trace their 
development, and explain their different levels of violence. The conclusion will draw the 
different threads together and present a more succinct analysis of how informal authorities in 
Kano contribute to conflict resolution. Appendix A discusses the data used, the research 
design, and some of the methodological problems and considerations that presented 




2  THEORISING CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The past few decades have witnessed an upsurge in academic writing on the causes and 
consequences of violent social or identity conflict, drawing on a great variety of disciplines 
and theoretical frameworks. Systematic studies on the causes and dynamics of ‘ethnic peace’, 
however, have been comparatively few and far between. Conflict resolution academics and 
practitioners have mainly focused on the specifics of practical third-party intervention 
strategies for dispute settlement; political scientists have produced detailed analyses of the 
effects of different kinds of political institutional frameworks on the intensity of ethnic 
conflict. In the latter category, some of the more recent works on ethnic conflicts have found 
negative correlations between levels of interethnic ‘civil society’ and the occurrence of 
violent ethnic conflict. Based on this evidence, they argue for the importance of ‘civil society’ 
associations in managing interethnic tensions and increasing social capital in a structural, 
institutional way (Tillie 2004; Varshney 2002).   
 The problems of this hypothesis are most clearly summarised by Brass (2003: 418): 
“[Varshney’s] argument becomes tautological: where there is extensive civic engagement 
between Hindus and Muslims, there is peace, which amounts to saying that where there is 
peace, there is peace”. This thesis will therefore problematise the relationship between ‘civil 
society associations’ and ethnic peace, seeking to uncover some of the specific mechanisms 
through which informal authorities, part of the sphere of ‘civil society’, can affect social 
conflict in Kano. To do this, the first section proposes a theoretical framework for social 
conflict pivoting around the construction and maintenance of social identities, which are 
posited to be the basis of group perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour. The subsequent section 
will critically discuss the existing literature on conflict resolution, suggesting a tentative 
approach to systematically link conflict resolution and social conflict theory.  With this 
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approach in mind, section 2.4 will discuss in more detail the complex relationship between 
informal authorities and conflict resolution. 
 
2.2 The Social Construction of Conflict 
Although the disciplines of conflict and peace studies assume the myriad manifestations of 
conflict can usefully be analysed under the same category of ‘conflict’, this concept is 
essentially contested. In general terms, conflict is a process of human interaction characterised 
by competition rather than cooperation (Deutsch and Coleman 2000: 21-28). However, 
because of the lack of a theoretical framework that can match such a high level of conceptual 
aggregation, this thesis looks at a sub-type of conflict. Existing conflict resolution literature is 
largely based on two such sub-types: inter-personal disputes and wars. Using conflict 
resolution theory based on these types, this chapter will apply it to a third category, best 
described as ‘social conflict’. This term was first used widely in Marxist analysis, which 
posited a class struggle intrinsic to capitalist, bourgeois society. Social conflict between 
classes was considered society’s engine on the path towards socialism (Dahrendorf 1959: 45-
57; 1988). Although the Marxist belief in the necessity of class conflict and its deterministic 
view of societal progress are problematic, with many scholars arguing that large social 
categories like class, religion, ethnicity and ideology are constructed rather than given, the 
concept of social conflict as struggles between social groups still has relevance. 
 It points to certain characteristics of social conflict that can be used as a working 
definition. First, social conflict is a struggle between groups of people within a particular 
societal system, which are defined in terms of a shared identity like ethnicity, religion, class, 
or ideology. Within a given society at any point in time, many different social conflicts exist, 
only some of which lead to violence. Second, social conflict is not merely a state, a static 
situation that locks certain actors in structural competition, but rather as a dynamic process of 
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competition comprising antagonistic relationships and episodes of escalation, with “stages of 
initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation and some kind of termination” 
(Cheldelin 2003: 40). Third, these escalation processes can either be constructive and lead to 
societal progress, or destructive and lead to violence. Although the dynamic nature of conflict 
processes defies strict classification of conflicts into either the constructive or destructive 
category, it is argued here that the defining characteristic of destructive conflict is the 
presence of violence8.  
 Although there is no generally accepted definition, violence is often taken to denote 
behaviour that hurts, kills, or injures people, or damages or destroys their property. As 
Galtung argues, however, this is a narrow definition of violence: “if this were all violence is 
about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is held up as an ideal. Highly 
unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace” (Galtung 1969: 168). He 
therefore proposes that “violence is defined as the cause of the difference between [people’s] 
potential and actual realisations” (Galtung 1969: 168). This leads him to distinguish between 
direct personal violence and structural violence, where the former denotes an agent-oriented 
definition of violence and the latter the systemic ways in which structures of exploitation and 
dependency can prevent people from reaching their potential. The analytical use of such a 
wide definition is doubtful, as it attempts to include all acts that are morally reprehensible, or 
“anything that Galtung does not like” (K. E. Boulding 1978: 346). Violence is therefore 
limited to its agent-oriented definition of ‘direct violence’. But although structures cannot be 
                                                
8 This view of violence as destruction is philosophically contested. It is based on a Gandhian notion that moral 
‘truth’ is not objectively knowable and that there can therefore never be a ‘truly’ just cause for inflicting harm 
upon others (Sharp 1999). Non-violence is thus the only morally justifiable form of action. ‘Just war’ political 
philosophers agree that violence is essentially destructive, but hold that it can be justified as a necessary evil to 
prevent worse evil from occurring (e.g. Walzer 1992). Writers like Fanon, however, do not view violence as 
necessarily destructive. Fanon argues that violence for the just cause of national liberation is not a necessary evil 
but a regenerative and creative force that deconstructs structures of oppression, and “cleanses” and unites the 
oppressed (Fanon 2001: 74). Religious ‘holy war’ theories (see also section 2.4) occupy an ambiguous 
intermediate position, in which the just cause for war, the defence of religion, can warrant either defence of the 
religious community against aggression or aggressive conversion to combat ‘infidelity’ or ‘heathenism’, 
depending on the specific interpretation.  
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inherently violent, episodes of collective violence can also not be explained away as 
individual abberations. Collective violence can only be explained as the continuity of social 
interactions by other means (Clausewitz et al. 1997). The crucial question then becomes: how 
to conceptualise the link between structures and violence? 
The dominant answer to this question is provided by theories on structural ‘root 
causes’ of violent conflict. Root causes, which can be categorised into cultural, political, and 
economic hypotheses, are assumed to be the most fundamental causes of violent struggle in 
society. Cultural hypotheses, like Huntington’s clash of civilisations (2002), have largely been 
discarded because of their essentialist view of ‘cultural’ identities. Political and economic root 
causes of conflict have much more relevance in explaining social conflict. Political causes can 
include institutional discrimination, political competition on the basis of contested identities, 
and the strength and stability of a political regime (Collier 2004; Horowitz 2000; Tilly 2003). 
The main economic hypothesis poses that horizontal inequalities - political, social, or 
economic inequalities between identity groups - explain violent conflict. Inter-group 
inequality is hypothesised to forge relatively deprived constituencies, creating shared 
grievances that can be mobilised. Violence is most likely to occur where horizontal 
inequalities widen rapidly (Jönsson 2006: 33; Nafziger et al. 2000; Stewart 2002). 
 Although these theories are formally probabilistic, they do assume that ‘objective’ 
structural conditions are the cause of violent conflict. This view has been challenged as too 
deterministic, not least because of the uncritical positivist basis of most of the root cause 
research methodologies. As Brass (1997: 9-10; 2003: 16-18) argues in his analysis of 
communal riots in India, the problem of explaining instances of violence from structural 
causes is that, while the causes are relatively stable, occurrences of violence are variable. It is 
therefore difficult to argue that certain structural ‘root causes’ actually lead to violent conflict. 
Moreover, Brass argues that the pursuit of causal explanations “is in itself a political struggle 
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that occurs invariably after every riot, […] for the establishment of a hegemonic consensus, 
which in turn will determine power relations in society” (Brass 2003: 22). Conflict analysis 
based on positivist objectivity is therefore by definition flawed. Instead, we need to consider 
conflict and violence as socially constructed phenomena and conflict analysis should focus on 
the discursive structures and search for the “deeply embedded continuity” of conflict and 
violence, “reinforced through dominant discursive and institutional frameworks” (Jabri 1996: 
105), rather than looking for ‘objective’ structural causes.  
 One way of addressing the problems of causality is to distinguish between the 
construction of social conflict and the production of violence in the name of this conflict. 
Social conflict thus becomes the competitive relationship between different social groups; 
violent escalation is an episode of collective action that is interpreted in terms of the social 
conflict. As social groups are defined, bounded, and given meaning through the perceived 
shared identity of their members, relationships between groups are also constructed through 
these social identities. Therefore, loosely following Jabri (1996) and Nordstrom (1995: 93-
115), it is argued here that if social conflict escalates, the nature of the social identity structure 
affects the character of the escalation. Integrative, inclusionary identities, that recognise the 
multiplicity, nestedness, and flexibility of social identities allow for constructive processes of 
conflict9. In contrast, exclusionary identities, which create impregnable group boundaries and 
zero-sum competition, contain the discursive legitimacy for violence and destructive conflict 
processes. 
 As it is presented here, this model seems to assume the stable, given nature of social 
identities. It is therefore complicated by the fact that identities are socially constructed. Social 
conflict is not caused by exclusionary social identities, but formed in the interaction of these 
                                                
9 In a way, this argument falls back on Arthur Bentley’s arguments about the necessity for cross-cutting 
cleavages and the danger of overlapping cleavages in managing social conflicts (see e.g. Bentley 1908). Because 
of the social-constructivist assumptions of this research, however, the question of importance is no longer which 
combination of cleavages causes violent conflict, but why and how such cleavages are constructed.  
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social constructions with ‘objective’ factors that shape the construction process. These factors 
are the ‘root causes’ of conflict, influencing both the content and the boundaries between 
social groups through the process of social identity construction. Their impact on the process 
of social conflict is mediated through identities and translated into meaningful perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviours. Chapter 4 will seek to illustrate this process in the context of Kano. 
 But how can exclusionary social identities explain violence, in other words, what is 
the link between social conflict and collective violence? This part of the theoretical frame 
relies on the subtle analysis of Indian riots by Brass (2003: 18-22), who argues that riots are 
produced in systematic, institutionalised ways. He does not look for causal explanations, but 
for the functional ‘mechanism’ of riot production as a short-lived social movement. Riots thus 
become a subject of political process studies explained from the viewpoint of collective 
action, mobilisation strategies, and opportunity. In this political process, as chapter 5 will 
show, violent actors draw on the structure of exclusionary identities to interpret and legitimise 
the violence displayed in riots.  
Exclusionary identities, by definition, claim dominance in the explanation and 
interpretation of social reality. Any shocks to the stability of the system, such as a fight in the 
market, killings of Muslims in Plateau state, or the reprinting of insulting cartoons of the 
Prophet Mohammed in France, are therefore likely to be interpreted in their terms. This 
process needs to be directed and fuelled by elites and other powerful actors, but also finds 
support in the perceptions of ‘ordinary’ people, who feel that the causes of conflict are 
legitimate reasons for protest and, possibly, violence. Therefore, explanations of riots as 
mobilised by self-interested politicians and as spontaneous outbursts of collective anger are 
both correct. As Brass notes, “[riots] are best conceived as dramatic productions in which the 
directors are not in complete control, the cast of characters varies – some of them paid, others 
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acting voluntarily – and many parts have been rehearsed, but others have not” (Brass 2003: 
32). Exclusionary identities provide the story of the play.  
In sum, this conflict approach focuses on group dynamics rather than deterministic 
root causes or individualist psychological or political-economic hypotheses10. It views social 
conflict as constructed through exclusionary social identities. Episodes of violent escalation, 
such as riots, are seen as collective action problems that build on the way in which social 
identities are constructed. The strength of this approach lies in the researcher’s ability to 
incorporate critical arguments on conflict theory without denying the role of root causes of 
conflict entirely. It can be used to explain both collective violence and non-violence, because 
this variance depends on the nature of the identity structures as well as the ways in which 
these identities are used during periods of escalation. Therefore, it is a useful theoretical basis 
to begin thinking about the ways in which violence can be stopped or prevented – in other 
words, about conflict resolution. 
 
2.3 Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution theory is a diverse, nascent field that draws on many social science 
disciplines in order to explain and enhance ways to prevent, manage, end, and transform 
violent conflict. Generally, conflict resolution is the constructive, non-violent management of 
conflict. This, however, can denote two processes. It can mean the formal or informal 
settlement of (violent) disputes, in which the conflicting parties reach an agreement over their 
‘bone of contention’ (Reimann 2004: 7)11. Although such settlements may end or prevent 
violence from occurring, they hardly address the social contradictions that give meaning to 
social conflicts. Taking conflict resolution to mean conflict transformation provides a more 
                                                
10For examples of these individualist approaches, see e.g. Keen (1998) and Larsen (1993). 
11Following Burton  (1972: 15), disputes are about clearly defined (material) interests and can be resolved 
through negotiation and compromise; conflicts are larger struggles pertaining to issues that are not easily settled 
through compromise. Disputes can thus be manifestations of conflicts. 
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comprehensive term, addressing the social identity structure underlying the destructive 
escalation of conflicts (Miall et al. 1999: 63-64). Such a ‘deep’ conception of conflict 
resolution as transformation can include dispute settlements, which may initially be needed to 
end violence, but also requires structural peacebuilding measures. In the terms introduced 
above, conflict resolution should aim for the reconstruction of social identities as inclusive 
rather than exclusive and is thus a continuous, never-ending enterprise to recreate societal 
structures and institutions. 
The academic discipline of conflict resolution addresses two main intellectual 
problems in an often intermingled way. First, it focuses on the suitability of different actors 
for conflict resolution, a problem that is conventionally addressed in terms of third-party 
interventions. There is a substantial literature on the necessary characteristics of third-parties 
in terms of neutrality, (im)partiality, power and authority (Bercovitch et al. 2002: 1-24; 
Berridge 2002: 1-84). More recently, conflict analysts have begun to distinguish between 
Track I, Track II, and Track III actors: Track I actors include national-level political and 
military leaders using short-term outcome-oriented strategies; Track II is constituted by 
private individuals, academics, and conflict resolution NGOs, which use process-oriented 
strategies; and Track III comprises grassroots leaders, development agencies and human 
rights organisations using both process- and structure-oriented strategies (Reimann 2004: 6).  
However, as Richmond (2001) argues, the different Tracks operate within the same 
environment of power and politics, in which all social actors are mutually dependent on each 
other and thus more strongly linked than the Tracks approach hypothesises. Moreover, the 
Tracks approach is based on a realist view of politics that prioritises the role of the state and 
the international community over other social actors. In response to this, Lederach (1997) has 
emphasised the importance of ‘bottom-up’ conflict resolution:  
“The principle of indigenous empowerment […] involves a new set of lenses 
through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the 
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‘problem’ and the outsiders as the ‘answer’. Rather we understand the long-term 
goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within 
the setting” (Lederach in Miall et al. 1999: 58) 
 
‘Conflict resolution actors’ in Kano, such as informal authorities, are thus considered  part of 
the conflict; their agency and interactions can affect its development both constructively and 
destructively. Their role in conflict resolution does not consist of external ‘third-party’ 
interventions, but of strategic and moral agency endogenous to the conflict.  
The second problematique of conflict resolution considers the multitude of 
mechanisms through which conflict is resolved. A useful way of ordering these mechanisms 
is by matching them to particular phases in the conflict process – the ‘contingency approach’ 
(Fisher and Keashly 1991: 30). This approach hypothesises that “ the greater the level of 
conflict escalation, the more coercive the intervention must be” (Reimann 2004: 6). There is 
considerable debate over the rigid chronological divisions made in earlier incarnations of this 
model, as well as over the particular mechanisms in these divisions (Webb et al. 1996); 
however, the central point about the complementary nature of different conflict resolution 
mechanisms over time is useful. As chapter 5 will illustrate, there are five broad phases in the 
dynamic of violent escalations: a structural negative peace, without violence but with the 
social identity structures underlying the violence present; a dynamic of escalation, in which 
mutual hostilities, further polarisation, and triggering events intensify the tensions between 
different social groups; the violent encounter; the phase of de-escalation and recovery after 
the violence; and the new structural situation, which may or may not have changed from the 
initial negative peace12. It is important to note that this is not a deterministic model for riots in 
Kano; in fact, at any point in the process the dynamic can be reversed or changed. The 
purpose of the model is to serve as a map for the ordering of the different roles of social 
actors, specifically informal authorities, in the conflict resolution process. 
                                                





The model hypothesises that each phase requires a different emphasis in conflict 
resolution approaches. In a situation of negative peace, conflict resolution means transforming 
the structural relationships between social groups – that is transforming their exclusionary 
social identity structure. The mechanisms in this phase are mostly referred to as 
peacebuilding, which can comprise activities such as inter-group reconciliation and third-
party consultation (Fisher and Keashly 1991: 30-32), but also the eradication of the root  
causes that are used to construct the situation of conflict (Lodge 1991: 147; Miall et al. 1999: 
187-89). Peacebuilding thus overlaps with more general development strategies and targets 
(see e.g. Merrill 2002: 96-111). During the phase of escalation, usually triggered by 
exogenous shocks, different mechanisms are required to prevent the shock from being 
translated into violence, such as formal and informal dispute resolution, the provision of non-
violent alternative strategies to violence, and law enforcement interventions. In the phase of 
open violence, priority lies with ‘peacemaking’ and caring for casualties. After violence has 
ceased, the early stages of de-escalation require renewed dialogue and inter-group 









These contingent strategies, however, can only be effective if their combined effect is 
the reconstruction of social identities in such a way that there is room for cooperation and 
constructive conflict processes. One of the crucial insights gained from critical analyses of 
conflict resolution is that existing conflict resolution methods, based on bridging the gap 
between conflicting identity groups, may solidify the identity structure even though their 
motivation may be to achieve the opposite (Sen 2006: 41-42). Such solutions, created within 
the existing dominant discourse and institutions, may therefore only serve to recreate the kind 
of conflict they are trying to resolve (Rupesinghe 1995: 93-116). Instead, a ‘counter-
hegemonic’ strategy is needed, emphasising the multiplicity and flexibility of social identities. 
 
2.4 Informal Authorities in Conflict Resolution  
In line with the research problem in chapter 1, this thesis seeks to locate conflict resolution 
efforts of informal authorities in Kano in the ‘contingency map’. Although not much has been 
written on the relationship between informal authorities and conflict resolution, some work on 
peacebuilding and ethnic riots in India can provide useful insights13. Generally, informal 
authorities (or grass-roots leaders) are conceived as Track III intervention actors. Their 
strengths are close connections to the masses and embeddedness in the context of the conflict. 
Their role is therefore largely conceived as informal or ‘quasi’ mediators (Kriesberg 1996), 
building trust and credibility in formal negotiation processes. In peacebuilding literature, 
Lederach (1997) focuses on indigenous social actors. He poses a pyramidal idea of social 
authorities, with elite-leaders and policy makers at the top, leaders of social organisations 
mid-level, and grass-roots community leaders at the base. Although he argues for the 
integration of all authorities in the conflict resolution process, the interconnected nature of 
social authorities and their dynamic and diverse roles deserve more systematic attention.  
                                                
13 There is also an overlap with theories on ‘traditional’ conflict resolution in Africa (e.g. Zartman 2000), but 
their fixation on the particularities of the ‘traditional’ often ignores the hybrid nature of contemporary 
‘traditional’ conflict resolution mechanisms.  
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 In the work on ethnic riots in India, Varshney (1997; 2001; 2002) stands out because 
of his specific focus on ‘civil society’ in the maintenance of ethnic peace. He argues that 
strong interethnic civic associations are the best predictors of ethnic peace (Varshney 2001: 
362-63; 2002: 9). The theoretical mechanism he quotes is an implicit variation on the much 
contested contact hypothesis, which holds that tensions and conflictual attitudes and 
behaviours are reduced by bringing the conflict parties in closer (and preferably 
institutionalised) contact with each other. However, for example Forbes (2004: 69-88) has 
shown that the causal links from increased contact to ethnic peace are ambiguous at best; 
Varshney’s approach (2002: 262-78), distinguishing between long-term and short-term 
causality, does not succeed in eliminating the problem interethnic civic association becoming 
a symptom of an inclusive identity structure as well as its cause. Moreover, Varshney (2002: 
31-35) fails to recognise that identities and social narratives can vary on sub-national levels, 
both between and within cities, and therefore ignores the effect of identity structures on the 
nature of local conflict and escalation processes.  
Lastly, as chapter 3 will argue in more detail, Varshney’s focus on civil society as 
independent from the state is problematic; although informal actors are not part of the state 
structure, their role in society is defined by their interactions with other informal authorities 
and with the state. The analysis below will therefore emphasise the interconnected nature of 
informal and formal authorities in the resolution of social conflict. Although this thesis does 
not endorse Brass’ radical claim that causality is inherently unsuited as an object of scientific 
research, there is need for more detailed analysis of the specific roles and capabilities of 
informal authorities in the conflict resolution process. Chapter 3 will begin this analysis of 
informal authorities in Kano by examining their position and role in Kano society. 
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3  INFORMAL AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT IN KANO 
 
3.1 Introduction: Informal Authority 
The concept of authority is intimately intertwined with the notion of power, an essentially 
contested concept that is “ineradicably value-dependent” (Lukes 2005: 30). As a working 
definition, this thesis largely follows Lukes’ view of the three-dimensional nature of power 
and the derived definition of authority, which is defined as the power bestowed in a given 
social actor on the basis of the legitimacy of his command (Lukes 2005: 21-36). Authority is 
thus a capacity, the legitimate power over a social group or community (Dahrendorf 1958: 
176; Lukes 2005: 35). Authority, however, also brings the responsibility to care for the 
community and represent its interests in society; therefore, authority can be seen to have an 
internal dimension, which gives power over a certain social group, and an external dimension, 
which gives the right and responsibility to represent the interests of the social group. 
Legitimacy is based on the value system of the person or group granting authority and can be 
derived from experience, knowledge, age, legitimate (s)election procedures, physical strength, 
and many other valuable attributes.  
 In contemporary international politics, authority is centred in the state (Migdal et al. 
1994; Migdal 2001). Its presence is in fact so ubiquitous that most political science and 
international relations literature analyses social reality within the framework of the state-
system. States are taken as unitary building blocks of the international system, as well as 
uniquely powerful actors in the analysis of intra-societal processes. In contrast, Migdal’s 
analysis of the fragility of developing state systems takes a radically different starting point: 
the view of the state in society. This theory sees society as a “mélange of social organisations” 
(Migdal 1988: 28), of clubs, societies, companies, and other social groupings, all of which are 
in competition for social control over (segments of) the population. The state is one of these 
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social groupings and as such also in constant competition with all other social organisations in 
society (Migdal 2001: 22-26).  
The state-in-society view thus defies essentialist distinctions between the state and 
non-state sectors of society and renders the concept of ‘civil society’ problematic. Civil 
society is often defined as the institutions and practices connecting “families and individuals 
with others beyond their homes, […] without interference from the state” (Varshney 2002: 
44); it is therefore viewed as democratic counterweight to the state. The state-in-society view, 
however, shows that state and civil society are part of the same political sphere and 
continuously interacting and competing (Whitfield 2002: 9-14). Moreover, social 
organisations are not mutually exclusive: members of parliament can belong to sports clubs, 
just like traditional rulers can be members of religious organisations. Therefore, it is more 
useful to define social organisations on the provenance of their authority: formal authorities 
derive their power from constitutional law, while informal authorities wield influence because 
of their connection to and embeddedness in the communities they represent. In Kano, formal 
authorities are part of the state, while informal authorities have flexible and ambiguous 
connections to it. This chapter looks specifically at three types of informal authority that play 
important roles in conflict processes in Kano: the ‘traditional’ Emirate, religious leaders, and 
leaders of ethnic associations and community elders.   
Although these authorities are agents in their own right, there are certain structural 
factors that shape their attitudes and behaviour towards conflict resolution. The next three 
sections of this chapter will outline four of those factors for each authority: their 
organisational structure and societal functions; their historical transformation; the community 
they represent; and the basis of their legitimacy. The final section will discuss the dominant 
NGO-led and religious ‘discourses of conflict resolution’ in Kano that also shape the attitudes 
and behaviour of these informal authorities towards conflict resolution.  
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3.2 Traditional Rulers 
Kano Emirate is the traditional structure of government in Kano state. Its organisational 
structure is highly hierarchical, with the Emir at the apex of the power structure, supported by 
an Emir’s Council that consists of four kingmakers, high-ranking district heads, Islamic 
scholars (mallamai) and other influential advisors. The Emir also chairs the Emirate Council, 
an advisory council to the government that consists of Local Government chairmen and 
allows the Emirate institutional access to the state. The Emirate has different levels of 
government. The Emir has 44 district heads (hakimai), who can be responsible for a territory 
or an administrative department. Each district head, especially in the rural districts, has 
several village heads (dagatai) who report to him. Each village consists of multiple wards, 
which are under authority of the ward head (masu unguwa). Village and ward heads are local 
people with roots in the community they supervise.  
  In addition to these institutions, there are several practices that are part of the 
responsibility of Kano’s traditional rules. In religious terms all imams in Kano need official 
recognition by the Emir to perform either daily or Juma’at prayers. Similarly, the Emir leads 
most of the annual religious festivals and calls the sighting of the moon at the start of the 
fasting14. In governance terms, traditional rulers use their community links to mediate 
disputes within their communities and between their community and the state. Although the 
executive responsibility for maintaining social stability lies with formal authorities15, it is 
culturally and politically preferred that disputes and other social disturbances are resolved 
informally, without resorting to the formal channels of law enforcement and adjudication 
(Paden 2005: 92; Wilson-Fall 2000: 49-50). Before the governance reforms of the late and 
post-colonial period, the traditional authorities were responsible for administering justice 
through formal channels, while informal dispute settlement was usually the job of community 
                                                
14 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, Islamic scholar, 10 September 2006 in Kano 
15 The federal government is responsible for Nigeria’s law enforcement agencies and the army, while the Kano 
state government provides the judiciary.  
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elders (Paden 2005: 92-93). In the current democratic dispensation, the Emirate has not 
replaced but subsumed the roles of these elders, striving to become the institutional umbrella 
for informal dispute settlement processes16.  
 To do this, the traditional authorities use their unique position between the Kano 
communities and the government. On the one hand, the organisational structure of the Emirate 
enables traditional rulers to retain a close connection to their people. The ward and village 
heads are part and parcel of the community they supervise17. They report all disturbances and 
problems to their superiors in the Emirate18. Policies and laws proposed by the government 
are reviewed by the Emirate Council to make sure “they will not cause conflict […] and will 
be helpful for the people, useful to the community”19. Although no formal power is attached 
to their advice, the Governor listens to the Emirate Council because of its broad base of 
popular support. Similarly, if state actors like the police misbehave or injure their 
communities, traditional rulers usually file a complaint defending the interests of their people 
against the police. 
On the other hand, the Emir also has close links to the Kano state government. In 
addition to informal dispute settlement, one of the institutional linkages between the Emirate 
and the government are ‘security committees’ that exist on state and local government levels 
as platforms for inter-authority cooperation. At the state level, the security committee: 
“…involves the executive Governor, the commandant of the military, the police 
commissioner, the Emir, the director of the state security services (the state 
intelligence) and other key people within the state. The same structure trickles 
down to the local government and if you come down to the wards it is more or 
less similar: the councillor of the ward is considered to be the chief security, the 
village head is there to assist him, the Divisional Police Officer is there.”20 
 
                                                
16 Tafidan Kura, district head Kura, 15 September 2006 in Kura 
17 Although outside Kano City, the connection between traditional rulers and their communities has suffered 
from the tremendous increase in the city’s population. 





The Emirate thus holds an ambiguous position between state and society, on the 
border between formal and informal authorities. This ambiguity can be explained by tracing 
the historical transformation of traditional institutions from a theocratic, despotic executive 
government to the symbolic ‘fathers’ of all people in Kano. Historically, the traditional 
government structure is an Islamic theocratic system of government, with the Emir as the 
“kingly power as a sacred trust from God” (Paden 1973: 214) and sharp demarcations 
between the ruling class (sarauta) and commoners (talakawa). While the Hausa Emirates 
(1500-1804) were based on the Islamic doctrines of al-Maghili (Paden 1973: 214) and the 
governance traditions of the Borno Empire, the Fulani Jihad (1804-1808) united them into the 
Sokoto Caliphate, which strengthened the link between governance and Islam (Dudley 1968: 
11). The Caliphate retained its executive powers under the British Chief Commissioner as 
Native Authority (NA) under colonial rule (1903-1960) (Dudley 1968: 13). However, the 
rationalisation and bureaucratisation of the Emirate administrative structure (Mustapha 1990) 
and the newly found British military and economic support ensured accountability from the 
Emir upwards, to the colonial government, but decreased the necessity for downward 
accountability. Indirect rule therefore made the NA more authoritarian, or “decentralised 
despotist” (Mamdani 1996: 53-65).  
 This increasing despotism led to a crisis of legitimacy of Emir Sanusi in the 1950s 
(Paden 1973: 270-71), which was compounded by greater tensions between the indigenous 
and settler communities21 and the rise of a Western-educated counter-élite, a group of 
intellectuals who became increasingly critical of Emirate rule (Yahaya 1980: 26). From the 
1950s, this counter-élite came to re-present the old conflict between the sarauta and talakawa 
classes in the struggle between the conservative NPC and Aminu Kano’s radical NEPU 
(Yahaya 1980: 30). Their incremental reforms, from the 1954 Native Authority Law to the 
                                                
21 See chapter 4 for more detail. 
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Local Government Reform of 1976, effected a transformation of the traditional authority from 
executive to symbolic, or formal to informal, functions – not simply a rejection of 
‘traditionalism’ (Yahaya 1980: 203, 22). As symbolic father to all people in Kano, the Emir’s 
main function is to create and enhance cohesion, stability, and community consciousness in 
the state. Kano Emirate thus represents a territorial community of the people of Kano and a 
religious community of Kano Muslims22.  
 After its transformation from formal to informal leadership, traditional authority over 
its communities has been based on five interlinked elements. First, traditional authority is 
based on the close link between the rulers and the community of the territory. Traditional 
rulers are said to be “part and parcel” of their community and are therefore accepted as 
legitimate authorities. Second, their legitimacy is based on long-term commitment, as 
opposed to the short-term (and often self-interested) positions held by elected politicians23. 
Third, their symbolic function and message of unity and peaceful integration grants traditional 
rulers legitimacy, especially in a context where politics is perceived as ‘a dirty game’, 
revolving around power, money, and patronage. Thus, it is the very distance of traditional 
rulers from power and politics that explains their legitimacy. Fourth, people’s perceptions of 
the personal qualities of traditional rulers plays an important role in determining their 
legitimacy. The incumbent Emir and his representatives are widely seen as wise and 
knowledgeable, honest, and fair in their treatment of both ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. Last,  the 
Emirate symbolically represents the unity of Kano and a long tradition of both African and 
Islamic state building. Much like Western European royal families, history and tradition give 
meaning to the Emirate institutions and grant them legitimacy in the eyes of their people.  
                                                
22 It would seem that Muslims in Kano are therefore structurally favoured by the traditional rulers over non-
Muslims, as non-Muslim groups in Kano are not explicitly represented in the Emirate system. However, the 
personal efforts of the incumbent Emir Bayero (1963-), who has focused on reconciling differences both within 
the ‘native’ Muslim community and between the ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in Kano (Paden 1973: 352-53), have 
balanced the structural favouritism within the Emirate system. 
23 Tafidan Kura, op. cit. 
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3.3 Religious Leaders 
3.3.1 Islamic Leaders 
Islamic authorities in Kano can be divided into the Sufi Brotherhoods (tariqas), radical 
reformist movements, and the JNI, the umbrella organisation for Islam in Nigeria. 
Historically, Islam in Kano has been represented by the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya tariqas. 
Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, rests on the core belief that Muslims should foster their 
personal relationship with God. The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya tariqas are structured around the 
authority of a single leader (sheikh)24. For example, the Qadiriyya tariqa is led by Sheikh 
Qaribullah, son of the late Sheikh Nasiru Kabara25, who leads Kano members in prayer and 
zikir, the ritual remembrance of Allah (Kabara 2004: 66-80). In places outside of Kano, 
Sheikh Qaribullah can sanction representatives (muqadam) to represent him. In contrast, 
radical movements like Izala have a more formal organisational structure, with a president 
(amir), secretary, treasurer, and modern accountancy practices26. Similarly, the JNI is 
organised formally, with a chairman (the Sultan of Sokoto), supreme patron, secretary 
general, and a number of committees and state chapters (Loimeier 1997: 141).  
In terms of practices and functions, the role of religious authorities comprises on the 
one hand strengthening the faith, providing social services, managing marital and social 
tensions, and promoting the spiritual welfare among their followers; and on the other, 
representing the interests of their followers. Individual tariqas and radical associations usually 
focus more on internal responsibilities, while the JNI emphasises its role in uniting Islam and 
‘evangelising’. It is characteristic of radical associations in Kano to attempt a wide provision 
of social services, such as hospitals, education, and crisis relief; whereas tariqas rely more on 
government provision (Gwarzo 2003: 302-08; Larkin and Meyer 2006: 306-08)27.  
                                                
24 Sheikh Qaribullah, leader of African Qadiriyya, 9 September 2006 in Kano 
25 Ibid.  
26 Dr Tahir Gwarzo, op. cit.  
27 Reverend Jebis, reverend ECCN and member of CAN, 14 September 2006 in Kano 
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Attitudes of these religious authorities to the state vary from radical anti-state to 
representing the interests of the state in a similar fashion to the Emirate authorities. The latter 
camp is largely occupied by the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya tariqas, which have close 
connections to the state government. They legitimise government policies, while profiting 
from this relationship through government subsidies and political influence (Gwarzo 2003: 
301). The radical movements generally question the legitimacy of the secular state (Gwarzo 
2003: 301), although some do accept government assistance. The fulcrum of radical criticism 
is the “non-implementation of Sharia and lack of Islamic zeal” (Gwarzo 2003: 302).  
The links between the Emirate and the tariqas have been subject to complex political 
struggles between the sarauta and talakawa classes and between the Kano Emirate and 
Sokoto. These patterns can be traced back to the fact that the Qadiriyya was the ‘established’ 
tariqa of the Sokoto empire after the Fulani Jihad (Loimeier 1997: 19-20), while the Tijaniyya 
was introduced only in the 19th century. Although competition between them was initially 
fought in the circles of the ruling elite and scholars, Tijaniyya affiliation was a sign of 
political and religious protest against the establishment (Loimeier 1997: 21). In the early 
1940s, the Tijaniyya transformed itself into a mass movement, with a support base among 
Kano’s traders, farmers, and artisans (Loimeier 1997: 71). The Qadiriyya reacted with a 
transformation (tajdid) under Nasiru Kabara (Paden 1973: 69-70), but remained conservative 
politically, linked to the traditional rulers in Sokoto, the sarauta class and the NPC; the 
Tijaniyya retained its connections with traders, talakawa and NEPU. In Kano specifically, 
Emirs Abdullahi Bayero and Sanusi were members of the Tijaniyya, demonstrating their 
spiritual and political independence from the Sultan, despite the fact that their network within 
Tijaniyya was linked to the Fulani ruling class (Loimeier 1997: 72-75).  
The establishment of the JNI by Sardauna Ahmadu Bello in the 1960s indicated a shift 
in his attitude from inter-tariqa competition towards pan-Islamic evangelisation. The JNI 
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mainly became involved in providing education, building new mosques, and other missionary 
(da’wa) activities (Loimeier 1997: 21). From the 1970s onwards, however, the dominance of 
the tariqas in Kano and the unity of Islam propagated by the JNI were challenged by a 
younger, Western educated generation of radical Muslims who criticised the fragmentation of 
the Muslim ummah, objected to their zikir rituals, and strove for a revitalisation (tajdid) of 
Islam and its return to the literal message of the Qur’an and the Hadith. The 1970s and 1980s 
were therefore characterised by social conflicts within the Muslim community in Kano, 
mostly between the radical Izala, founded in 1978, and the tariqas28. In contemporary Kano, 
however, both the tariqas and Izala have lost some of their former influence; many Kano 
Muslims go to mosque without being affiliated to a specific association29.  
Religious leaders, however, still wield considerable authority in Kano, based on a 
measure of ‘closeness to God’ – or in Sufi terminology, baraka. This term denotes spiritual 
grace, but has also come to imply political and economic power (Cruise O'Brien 1975: 10). A 
religious leader, such as an imam or Sheikh, is respected because he is believed to represent 
divine authority. In some forms of Islam, such as the Sufi tariqas, closeness to God can be 
transferred within dynasties, but it is mostly dependent on knowledge. Knowledge is available 
through informal networks of Islamic teachers or formal colonial educational institutions, 
such as the Kano School of Arabic Studies. If Islamic scholars earn the respect of their 
people, they are said to be part of the Ulama, a group of prominent and respected Islamic 
scholars (alim) in Kano. The distinction between imam and mallam is functional: an imam 
leads his congregation in prayer, the scholar researches and teaches the Qur’an and the 
Hadith. An imam, however, is always a mallam, while a mallam is not always an imam. 
Although the salience of religious identities in Kano confers extensive authority to religious 
leaders, this authority cannot necessarily be used to mobilise people for ends other than 
                                                
28 See section 4.3 for more detail. 
29 Among the Kano City respondents in the PS, only 5% were member of Tijaniyya, with no Qadiriyya or Izala. 
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religious worship30. The real extent of a religious leader’s authority depends on a complex 
mix of factors, such as the scope of his knowledge, his charisma and age, and the benefits of 
his preaching and leadership to the community. Imams, as well as Christian leaders, are 
dependent on the number of faithful attending their prayers and services31. 
 
3.3.2 Christian Leaders 
Christianity was introduced in northern Nigeria through migration of southern Christians and 
the missionary activities of both Western and African missionaries. It is organised in churches 
that differ in doctrine, rituals, social position, and membership. Although the exact number is 
unknown, a quick survey of the Sabon Gari area showed that almost every street has at least 3 
churches of various denominations; Egbe road, the westernmost street of Sabon Gari, is home 
to no less than 25. In organisational terms, a distinction can be made between ‘orthodox’32 
and Pentecostal churches: the former have formal organisational structures and are led by an 
executive council on the basis of a church constitution33, while the latter are structured around 
the charismatic authority of ‘prophets’ (Marshall 1995: 244).  
Individual churches of both types are linked to Christian movements and organisations 
in Nigeria and abroad, through missions, sponsorship, and education of their leaders34. 
Churches in Kano are also represented in CAN, which represents the interests of Nigerian 
Christians in the political sphere and mirrors the Islamic claim for a universal ummah. As one 
member put it:  
“[CAN] originated in the north, in Kaduna, because of the opposition to 
Christianity [in this region]. I think most Christians suffered from the hands of the 
Muslims, and therefore the Christians saw that there was a need for them to come 
together so they will be one, as Christ teaches in John, 7, 21.”35 
                                                
30 Dr Tahir Gwarzo, director Kano State Polytechnic, 10 August 2006 in Kano 
31 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit. 
32 ‘Orthodox’ denotes denominational churches, e.g. Protestant or Catholic.  
33 Reverend Jebis, op. cit.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
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The roles of Christian authorities are similar to those of the Islamic authorities, combining 
both internal and external responsibilities. Individual churches focus more on their internal 
responsibilities, many of which include a wide range of social services, such as hospitals, 
education, and crisis relief. The external functions of Christian leaders are sensitive in 
Muslim-dominated Kano, but while many ‘orthodox’ churches refrain from open competition, 
Pentecostal churches and CAN are strongly evangelical (Marshall 1993: 233-36).  
The link between Christian leaders and traditional rulers is ambiguous, because of 
close links between the Emirate and Islam. Although the appointment of Christian traditional 
rulers in Kaduna state shows that Christians could become part of the Emirate structure, 
Sabon Gari remains part of the larger Fagge district and represented by a Muslim district 
head36. Churches have a similarly ambiguous relationship with the Kano state government: 
they oppose the state because of its Islamic character, but also accept and depend on it in 
terms of law enforcement37. The basis of most Christian religious authority is similar to that 
of Islamic leaders, based on knowledge, followers and respectability. Pentecostal authority is 
exceptional because its leaders rely on Ase, a form of charismatic power that derives both 
from adherence to the frugal mores of the ‘born-again’ doctrine and from a measure of wealth 
and social success (Marshall 1993: 226).  
 
3.4 Ethnic and Community Leaders 
Ethnic leaders and community elders are community authorities who perform informal 
leadership functions at the local level. In Sabon Gari, there are two types of non-indigenous 
ethnic authorities: the traditional rulers and the leaders of the ethnic associations. The 
traditional rulers of non-indigenous ethnic groups, such as the Eze Igbo and the Oba Yoruba, 
wield positions that have been created, or ‘invented’, as ‘traditional’ specifically in the 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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context of Kano’s centralised Emirate structure (Osaghae 1994: 59-60). Non-indigenous 
traditional rulers are “in charge of everything pertaining to tradition and culture”38; the 
administrative and limited executive authority in the communities is wielded by the ethnic 
associations. Every ethnic group in Sabon Gari has their own traditional rulers and ethnic 
association, but the Igbo and the Yoruba Associations are the most influential due to the size 
of their communities39.  
Ethnic associations are usually formally organised, with a constitution and an elected 
executive council. They also have several functional committees, such as the peace committee 
that deals with crises within the Igbo community40. Every ethnic association is divided into 
state or hometown unions, which compete among themselves for recognition in committees 
and functions of authority. Together, the executive councils of the ethnic associations have 
formed the non-indigene leadership association (NLA), whose main role is to mediate 
between members of different ethnic groups and represent the entire non-indigenous 
community in interactions with the state. Individually, most of these ethnic associations are 
part of larger regional or national ethnic associations41.  
 Ethnic associations developed in the 1940s after the position of Sarkin Sabon Gari, an 
institution that “provided legislative, judiciary and executive roles in regulating inter-group 
relations” (Olaniyi 2002: 22), was abolished and its authority transferred to the Kano Emirate. 
The new ethnic associations united the state and town unions (Olaniyi 2002: 21-24), but 
where the unions had focused on maintaining nationwide links within ethnic groups, ethnic 
associations and the newly ‘traditional’ ethnic rulers integrated into the institutional 
framework of the Kano Emirate (Olaniyi 2002: 25). Ethnic leaders promote development, 
security, and access to education, politics, and economic resources for their ethnic community 
                                                
38 Chief Boniface Ibikwe, president-general Igbo Association Kano, 16 September 2006 in Kano; Chief 
Olayiwole Adeaga, vice-president Yoruba community Kano, 6 September 2006 in Kano 
39 See section 4.2. 
40 Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit.  
41 Ibid.; Chief Olayiwole Adeaga, op. cit. 
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(or the entire non-indigene community, through the NLA) in interactions with the state and 
the traditional authorities. They function within the boundaries of the state and the Emirate, 
while challenging them for the emancipation of their community42.  
Ethnic associations are explicitly political in their outlook. They educate their 
members to be politically active and sometimes offer advice on who to vote for43. The recent 
appointment of an Igbo as advisor to Governor Shekarau was celebrated as progress for the 
Igbo community, and, by extension, a victory for the Igbo Association44. The internal 
functions of ethnic leaders resemble those of the Emirate, in leading rituals and ceremonies, 
managing tensions and informally settling disputes (Osaghae 1994: 62-63). Intra-ethnic 
disputes are settled by the corresponding ethnic association, whilst interethnic conflicts are 
addressed through either the NLA alone (if all parties are non-indigenes) or in cooperation 
with the district head of Fagge (if one of the parties is an indigene), the local government that 
comprises Sabon Gari.  
‘Native’ communities in Kano have elders, who command respect and authority 
because of their age and life experience. Older men in northern society, especially those with 
distinguished careers or extensive religious knowledge, may therefore occupy positions of 
informal communal authority (Paden 2005: 93). Their age, wealth, knowledge and experience 
command respect, their houses are social hubs for prayer, community discussions, and people 
come to them with problems. In the case of Hotoro, a neighbourhood in eastern Kano 
metropolis where a community elder was interviewed, all elders meet regularly (about once a 
month) in order to discuss the developments in their communities45.  
Like the traditional rulers, elders represent territorially delineated communities. Like 
ethnic leaders, however, their function comprises both representing their people in case of 
                                                
42 Chief Olayiwole Adeaga, op. cit. 
43 Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit. 
44 Ibid.; Chief Olayiwole Adeaga, op. cit. 
45 Anonymous (ii), community elder, 30 August 2006 in Kano 
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external problems and managing tensions and problems within their community. External 
representation can either go through the ward head or the local government channels, 
depending on the nature of the issue. Internal dispute resolution takes place through informal 
hearings and discussions and can lead to arbitration or a mediated settlement. If this proves 
unsuccessful, the dispute is referred to the ward head46.  
Although their roles are similar, there is a significant difference between the basis of 
authority of ethnic leaders and community leaders. Ethnic rulers are appointed on the basis of 
their suitability as ‘traditional ruler’. The Eze Igbo, for example, is selected on the basis of 
age, income, respectability, knowledge of traditions, and personal authority (Osaghae 1994: 
61). Leaders of ethnic associations, however, are democratically elected. Their legitimacy 
depends on ‘modern democratic’ values such as free and fair elections, transparent 
government, honesty, management skills, and progress of the community47. The authority of 
elders is determined by age, social accomplishments, and knowledge. Elders are not 
democratic representatives, but wise men whom people respect and listen to. For them, good 
leadership is not dependent on ‘modern’ qualities of good governance, but on the social skills 
and personal qualities of the elder:  
“A boss is someone who uses his influence to force you to do something. A 
leader is going together with you, to find out your problem and sort it out. […] 
You have to be equal to them, you have to come to them, talk to them the same 
way – don’t boss them. Then we will start and find an answer.”48 
 
3.5 Discourses on Conflict Resolution 
Previous sections have discussed the structure of informal authorities and their position in 
society, which affect their role in and capacity for conflict resolution. However, as critical 
thinkers like Foucault (e.g. 1979; 2004) have argued, the actions of informal authorities are 
not only determined by their characteristics, but also by the dominant discourses about 
                                                
46 Ibid.  
47 Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit. 
48 Anonymous (ii), op. cit. 
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conflict – in other words, by the way in which people in Kano think and talk about conflict 
and violence. This section will sketch two of the dominant discourses on conflict resolution 
that reflect and affect the ways in which informal authorities in Kano approach conflict 
resolution. The first one is the set of concepts and practices based on NGO analyses of 
conflict resolution; the second is the moral framework for violence and non-violence 
constructed in Islam and Christianity.  
 NGOs in Kano are thriving: KANET alone has 76 registered members, which is only 
part of the total number. Of the many conflict resolution NGOs, most are based on 
essentialised conflict models from the Western conflict resolution literature and on specific 
interpretations of the causes of the conflict in Kano. In terms of models, training manuals and 
other NGO documents often present an essentialised conflict model, in which conflict is 
analysed by listing the conflict parties, issues, physical context, and the stages of escalation 
(CRESNET 2005; Sodipo 2006). The emphasis of the training manuals, however, lies on the 
conflict prevention and resolution skills of mediation and negotiation.  
Alternative (or Appropriate) Dispute Resolution (ADR), as opposed to Traditional 
Dispute Resolution (TDR), is used as a catch-all for these skills. TDR in Kano is mostly 
equated with the informal dispute settlement by traditional and religious authorities, while 
ADR is the “imported and innovative, modern way of resolving disputes”49, thus reflecting 
the ambitions of the young generation of NGO leaders to improve on traditional ways of 
managing society. Similarly, the dominant NGO interpretation that conflict in Kano is caused 
by poverty and manipulative politics50 may reflect a widely acknowledged social agenda 
rather than a systematic analysis of the causes of violent conflict – even though poverty and 
politics undoubtedly play a role in the construction of violent conflict. 
                                                
49 Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya, executive director DAG, 1 August 2006 in Kano 
50 See section 4.4 for more detail. 
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 As with any discourse, the impact of this NGO discourse is difficult to assess. On the 
one hand, participants who were interviewed described a significant impact of the trainings on 
their daily lives, using conflict resolution vocabulary thoughtlessly. Ethnic associations, 
community leaders, and traditional authorities, especially among non-indigenous 
communities, are familiar with the language of conflict resolution and ADR and emphasise its 
centrality to their work51. The large number of peace committees and early warning units is 
another sign that both formal and informal leaders think in the terminology of the ‘conflict 
resolution framework’. NGOs have thus helped to focus public and political attention on the 
problem of violent conflict in Kano. On the other hand, however, the conflict models 
propagated by these NGOs contain the risk of interpreting a complex social struggle as a 
dispute between clearly identifiable conflict parties. Such interpretations, of ‘Christians-
against-Muslims’ or ‘natives-against-settlers’, are not mere simplifications, but potentially 
reify and reinforce the oppositions rather than deconstruct them. This thesis does not have 
enough data to demonstrate these effects of the NGO discourse on the situation in Kano, but 
emphasises the possibility.    
 The second set of dominant ideas on conflict and conflict resolution in Kano stems 
from religion. Boulding (1986: 501) argues that “every religion has a vision of the peaceable 
kingdom […] and the holy war”. The peaceful kingdom is a metaphor for peace and non-
violence in social relations, but these same religions also contain a vision of the ‘holy war’, of 
legitimate conflict and even violence against disbelief and disbelievers. In Islam, jihad is the 
term that refers to the legitimate struggle to protect dar al-Islam, both within the individual 
and in the social domain. Evangelism in Christianity has a similar function, especially when it 
is presented in the medieval terminology of the crusades, as is the case in many churches in 
Kano. The ambiguous attitude of religion to violence reflects its inherently contradictory 
                                                
51Asma’u Ahmed, conflict resolution trainer, 26 August 2006 in Kano; Femi Sodipo, Coordinator PIN, 18 
August 2006 in Kano; Anonymous (ii), op. cit.; Anonymous (iii), motorcyclist, 15 August 2006 in Kano. 
41 
 
nature, of promoting peace and social harmony while making absolutist claims about 
representing a singular truth.  
 In Kano, Islamic and Christian leaders propagate both the peaceful and the conflictual 
aspects of their religions. Peace as an abstract moral value is preached in almost every church 
service and prayer session and both Christians and Muslims emphasise the central position of 
peace in their religion52. In some situations, however, the legitimacy of (violent) struggle is 
also preached. These patterns are exemplified by the statements of the JNI and CAN at the 
Northern Governors’ Forum in December 2004. Alhaji Makarfi, chairman of the Kaduna state 
chapter of the JNI, argues for the peaceful nature of Islam and the need for better mutual 
understanding of the religions: “misconceptions are the sources of the absence of reasonable 
peace among us… no religion can allow violence, injustice, destruction of public property” 
(Makarfi 2004: 3). However, Archbishop Jatau, chairman of CAN, argues that “the 
emergence of this crisis is a manifestation of the general crisis surrounding what people 
consider to be the lack of equal access [of various Christian communities] to opportunities.” 
(Jatau 2004: 4).  
The discrepancy between these two statements hints at a wider trend of religious 
discourse on conflict and violence, namely that religious authorities switch between the 
‘peaceful kingdom’ and ‘holy war’ on the basis of political interests. The JNI, representing 
the dominant majority community in northern Nigeria, emphasises the peacefulness of its 
religion in order to delegitimise and marginalise the Muslim violence in the riots of May 
2004. CAN, on the other hand, represents the minority community and therefore emphasises 
the legitimacy of its emancipatory struggle. Unfortunately, as Boulding argues, religions have 
not yet publicly claimed the ‘middle ground’ conflict discourse, but always resorted either to 
the legitimate struggle or the idyllic peace (E. Boulding 1986: 510). Although Boulding’s 
                                                
52 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit.  
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conception of the ‘middle ground’ remains vague, the political use of the idyllic peace and 
holy war discourses does not contribute to a constructive role of religious authorities in the 
conflict resolution process.  
 
3.6 Conclusion   
This chapter has discussed some of the structural factors that affect the roles of informal 
authorities in conflict resolution in Kano, showing that the authority wielded by the traditional 
rulers is dependent on their symbolic position between the government and the city’s various 
communities. However, this authority only extends to specific functions and roles in Kano 
society that are circumscribed as symbolic, informal, unifying, and community-oriented. 
These functions in Kano society allow traditional authorities to play a range of roles in the 
constructive resolution of conflict, from informal dispute settlement within communities and 
managing tensions between communities and the state to emphasising and reinforcing an 
inclusive pan-Kano identity for both ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’.   
Religious leaders also wield considerable authority, but occupy a more ambiguous 
position than traditional rulers. On the one hand, they are the institutional embodiment of the 
religious dimension of the ‘native’-‘settler’ conflict in Kano because (i) they represent 
exclusive religious communities; (ii) their  dichotomous moral worldviews, evangelisation 
agendas and connections to the heavily politicised JNI and CAN incentivise uncompromising, 
zero-sum competition; and (iii) their moral authority, which is partly based on charisma and 
divine legitimacy, does not necessitate downward accountability. On the other hand, their 
‘internal’ function of promoting the spiritual and material welfare of their community, the 
explicitly moral nature of their doctrines and authority and the discourses of peace embedded 
within both Christianity and Islam also provide religious leaders with considerable 
opportunities to stimulate non-violent conflict resolution. 
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Ethnic leaders and associations have considerable influence on social life at the local 
level and can affect conflict both through dispute settlement and managing tensions between 
their communities and the state or the traditional rulers. Ethnic associations are politicised, but 
unlike the religious leaders, whose political aims refer to the national competition between 
Islam and Christianity, their goals of emancipation and political advancement are set within 
the context of the Muslim-dominated Emirate and the state government. To some extent, 
community elders are the unofficial local extensions of the traditional governance system, 
while ethnic associations are slowly crafting their own and their communities’ place within 
the traditional and state institutions. Having outlined the nature and functions of informal 
authorities in Kano, chapter 4 will continue with an analysis of its social conflict. 
44 
 
4  DECONSTRUCTING SOCIAL CONFLICT 
 
“[For a long time,] Kano was the only state that would accommodate strangers. 
Everybody came from every part of the country, any part of the world, he could 
come to Kano. We, the people of Kano, have a tradition to receive him and settle 
him as his home. This made Kano a big city.” 53 
 
4.1 Introduction: Social Identity 
As a historical trading centre, many Kanawa feel that Kano is famous for its tolerance and 
successful integration of minorities; they therefore explain the city’s history of violent riots as 
ruptures of an essentially peaceful society, instigated by ‘hooligans’ and manipulative 
politicians54. In contrast to this view, an alternative narrative portrays Kano as a volatile 
environment, with high-strung political tensions coinciding with intense religious and ethnic 
oppositions. Violence, in this second view, is explained as a continuity of the underlying 
conflict structure. This chapter will seek to explain violence on the basis of the exclusionary 
nature of salient social identities and thus emphasise the narrative of Kano as a conflict 
situation.  
Identity, ubiquitous in contemporary discourse in both the political and academic 
circles, is analytically highly ambiguous (Brubaker 2004: 28-53). In its most general form, 
identity is a framework that comprises self-understanding and the way others perceive you, or 
“a sense of self that develops and is realised in interactions, making life predictable and 
meaningful” (Coy and Woehrle 2000: 91). It provides a sense of place in society, as well as a 
set of corresponding, meaningful social roles that allow people to act meaningfully. An 
individual’s ‘total’ identity is constructed from many different parts, including factors as 
widely divergent as her cognitive and physical make-up and the political institutions that 
frame her connection to power and the state. This thesis focuses on social identity, the part 
                                                
53 Tafidan Kura, op. cit. 
54 e.g. Dr Haruna Wakili, director Mambayya House, 9 August 2006 in Kano; Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit. 
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“derived from knowledge about social group membership and the value and meanings 
attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1982: 4).  Social identities give shared meanings to 
social interactions; in Onuf’s terminology (1989), social identities contain the accepted rules 
that maintain existing social arrangements.  
 Social identities thus comprise internal and external dimensions: internally, people 
within  a social group create a “contested standard of civic virtue against which personal 
esteem is measured” (Lonsdale 1994: 131-32); externally, social groups use social identities 
in political and economic competition, as Cohen (1969) shows for the Hausa in Ibadan. For 
ethnicity, Lonsdale refers to these dimensions as moral ethnicity and political tribalism: moral 
ethnicity is the sphere in which authority, social values and norms are contested and defined, 
while political tribalism denotes the sphere of “unprincipled competition” between ethnic 
groups (Lonsdale 1994: 140-41). Constructing social identities and social groups is thus partly 
a matter of creating internal cohesion, but also  of creating and continuously marking 
boundaries and difference through discourse and practice (Tambs-Lyche 1994: 54). 
It is a truism that people have multiple social identities, some of which are overlapping 
or nested within other identities. Individuals can thus identify with a variety of more or less 
institutionalised social groups. Like most truisms, however, this statement may conceal more 
than it explains because it leaves open important questions on the kinds of identities that result 
in conflict and the ways in which these are constructed. To understand the role of social 
identities in the construction of conflict and violence, section 4.2 will therefore discuss 
Kano’s social identity structure, drawing on the results of the Perceptions Survey (PS)55. It 
will show how constructed categories of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ are the structural basis of social 
conflict in Kano because they are constructed as ‘exclusionary’ and ‘securitised’. To explain 
                                                
55 The PS was explicitly designed to measure perceptions and attitudes, which limits the value of the survey 
because it cannot be used as evidence for the ‘objective’ social, economic, or political conditions in Kano, except 
for some basic demographics. It can, however, provide data on how people in Kano interpret their social reality 
and thus explicate the constructed basis of social conflict in Kano. See appendix A for more details. 
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how this social conflict has developed, section 4.3 will suggest important historical factors 
driving the development of ethnicity, religion, class and indigeneity in Kano, after which 4.4 
will discuss the ways in which contemporary ‘root causes’ of conflict in Kano have come to 
be interpreted in terms of  existing salient social identities.  
 
4.2 Social Identities in Kano 
There are several analytical distinctions between types of social identities that are useful to 
understand the links between social identities and conflict. One distinction is between 
‘ascriptive’ and ‘affiliative’ identities, the former denoting identities that are beyond people’s 
ability to choose (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity), and the latter denoting those within the realm 
of choice (Horowitz 2000: 21-36). In terms of conflict, tensions between ascriptive groups are 
then hypothesised to be more intractable than affiliative ones because ascriptive identity 
labels are less flexible. The differentiating variable of ‘ability to choose’, however, is 
problematic. Social or economic pressures may render identities that some perceive as 
affiliative ascribed; different contexts may also label different identities ‘affiliative’ or 
‘ascribed’. It is thus not a matter of whether or not people are free to choose certain 
affiliations, but if they feel they are free to do so. Instead of a dichotomy between ‘ascriptive’ 
or ‘affiliative’ the perceived hardness of identity boundaries is a continuum, denoting the ease 
with which people are perceived to be able to change membership of certain social groups.  
 A second distinction is between ranked and unranked social identities (Horowitz 2000: 
22). In Horowitz’ terminology, ethnic groups are ranked if they coincide with class 
differences (Horowitz 2000: 25). Stated in more general terms, the problem addressed here is 
the distinction between social identity and social positioning (Besteman 1999: 265). While 
Horowitz considers ranking a fixed characteristic of certain inter-group relations, class is 
viewed here as a social identity and ranking, therefore, as part of the process of identity 
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construction. The third distinction is based on ‘groupness’: the extent to which people who are 
perceived to share a social identity in fact form a “mutually recognising, effectively 
communicating and bounded collectivity with a corporate identity” (Brubaker 2004: 12). 
Groups, Brubaker (2004: 10-13) argues, are too often uncritically ‘reified’ both in political 
practice and conflict analysis. Analysts should avoid reinforcing the political practice through 
their analyses and consider ‘groupness’ as a contingent rather than a given variable.   
Combining these three variables, social conflict is constructed through hard or 
‘exclusionary’ social identities and their dynamic ranking (Jabri 1996: 121). Exclusionary and 
ranked identities tend to create high levels of ‘groupness’ (Brubaker 2004: 12) and thus to 
become, in the words of Roe (1999), ‘securitised’: interactions between the identity groups 
come to be framed in terms of zero-sum competition. Securitised identities are often seen as 
of paramount importance to the members of all groups; in the most extreme of circumstances, 
threats to these identities are framed in terms of the denial of ‘basic human needs for 
identification’ and the survival of the entire identity group. In this context, such social 
identities also tend to become more highly institutionalised than other identities in order to 
protect the interests of the group. Whatever the mandate or purpose of these institutions, their 
existence reaffirms the importance of their particular social identity to society and, as such, 
reinforces the basis of the social conflict.  
Neatness, according to Simons (1995: 192), in social science is never to be trusted; 
complexity and ambiguity are to be embraced rather than explained away. It is with this 
dictum in mind that this section will discuss the nature of social identity in contemporary 
Kano. The argument made here is that (i) the social conflict, leading to the riots discussed in 
chapter 5, in Kano is best understood in terms of ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’; (ii) this ‘native’-
‘settler’ cleavage is constructed through four different but interlinked social identities, 
ethnicity, religion, legal indigeneity, and class; (iii) these identities are salient in the self-
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perceptions of both indigenes and non-indigenes; and (iv) these identities are constructed as 
‘exclusionary’ and conflictual.  
The categories of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ are complex composites of different social 
identities in Kano, most notably ethnicity, religion, class, and legal indigeneity. In legal terms, 
indigeneity is related to notions of state citizenship in Nigeria. As Alubo (2006: 68-74) 
argues, Nigerian citizenship is a two-tier structure, where a Nigerian is first an ‘indigene’ of a 
particular state and only secondly a Nigerian. In Kano, legal indigeneity is defined by a 
person’s ancestry in Kano state and partly determines a person’s access to economic and 
political resources. The broader concepts of ‘native’ and ‘settler’, however, include meanings 
related to religion, ethnicity, and to some extent class. ‘Natives’ live in Kano City, are 
predominantly Hausa Muslims and can trace their ancestry back to Kano state. ‘Settlers’ live 
in Sabon Gari and belong to predominantly Igbo, Yoruba and other non-indigenous ethnic 
groups, are predominantly Christian56, originating from states other than Kano. The best 
proxy for this broad conception of indigeneity is neighbourhood: ‘natives’ predominantly live 
in Kano City, whilst ‘settlers’ live in Sabon Gari. Other neighbourhoods, like Brigade or 
Hausawa, are more mixed in demographic composition. The perceptions of inhabitants of 







                                                





Figure 4.157 summarises these trends, but also shows that the broad indigeneity 
categories are not as crisp as they are portrayed here. Some legal indigenes of Kano may 
differ from the broad conception of indigene because they are Maguzawa or Christian, or 
simply because they prefer the liberal mores of Sabon Gari, and therefore live with the non-
indigenes. Alternatively, some Hausa Muslims in Kano City, accepted as ‘natives’, may not 
be considered legal indigenes because they originate from Jigawa or Katsina states. 
Depending on the context and the individual background of the people involved, differences 
between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ can manifest themselves in religious, ethnic, legal indigeneity, 
or class terms. The ‘native’-‘settler’ cleavage is not necessarily a dichotomy, although it is 
often imagined in that way. Historically, ‘native’ and ‘settler’ distinctions were a matter of 
degree, with different levels of assimilation based on ethnicity, religion, and class. Although 
historical and contemporary developments  have hardened the boundaries between Sabon Gari 
                                                
























Figure 4.1: Key Characteristics of Kano City and Sabon Gari Respondents 
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migrants and Kanawa and strengthened the imagination of a dichotomy between them, there 
are still many distinctions and levels of integration between them.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the salience of different social identities, as found in the PS, in Kano 
City and Sabon Gari. It depicts, for each identity, the percentage of people in these two 
neighbourhoods who label it as one of the three most important ways in which “they think 
about themselves”. In total, the four most important identities are religion, gender, ethnicity, 
and occupation; between the two neighbourhoods, however, significantly different rankings 
emerge. In both Kano City and Sabon Gari religion is by far the most important social factor 
in the process of self-identification. While gender and ethnicity58 are second and third in Kano 
City, occupation and ethnicity take those positions in Sabon Gari59.  
                                                
58 In the Nigerian context, language and ethnicity can be used as one analytical category.  
59 In the attitudes-survey by Lewis and Bratten (2000) ethnicity is most the salient self-identification in Nigeria 
at large, while religion is most salient for northern Muslims. The latter pattern is consistent with the PS data, as 
‘natives’ identify mostly with religion, but in contrast to the national pattern religion is also most salient for 


























The relative importance of gender among ‘natives’ may be explained by the fact that 
Islam and northern Nigerian Hausa tradition have more pronounced gender roles than many of 
the immigrant communities. The prevalence of neighbourhood in Sabon Gari might be caused 
by the fact that it is the only locality where non-indigenes dominate. In many ways, Sabon 
Gari is a city within a city: beer parlours and small brothels indicate the lack of Sharia 
influence, whilst the Western clothing style and the multitude of languages spoken mark the 
lack of indigene-dominance. Respondents from Sabon Gari flagging their neighbourhood as 
important may therefore implicitly indicate the importance of their migrant, non-indigene 
status in Kano as well as their community. The importance of occupation, a proxy for class, in 
Sabon Gari could be explained by arguing that people in Sabon Gari are mostly economic 
migrants and therefore identify strongly with their occupation.  
To demonstrate that the ‘native’-‘settler’ cleavage is the basis of social conflict in 
Kano we must now show that these identities are not only salient, but also exclusionary, with 
‘hard boundaries’ and high levels of ‘groupness’. For each of these identity layers, several 
factors indicate their exclusionary nature. In ‘legal indigeneity’ terms, identity boundaries are 
hard because there is no procedure for becoming legally indigenous. As Mustapha (2007: 10) 
argues, it would be more in keeping with Nigerian culture and tradition if residency rights 
would be granted to ‘settlers’ who pay taxes and swear allegiance to their new home state. 
Ethnicity, even though imagined and by definition political, is experienced as ascribed, in 
terms of shared ancestry, history, and cultural distinctiveness60. In fact, many people in Kano 
claim the capacity to distinguish between ethnic groups on the basis of mere physical traits. 
When examined more closely, however, language, dress, residence, and cultural or religious 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘settlers’ in Kano. This ‘uncharacteristic’ salience of religion in Sabon Gari can be explained as a ‘mirror-effect’: 
the immigrant community, faced with a strongly religious host, identifies itself in the host’s terms. Interestingly, 
however, as figure 4.4 shows, people in Sabon Gari do identify ‘native’ and ‘settler’ Others in terms of ethnicity. 
60 Ethnicity in this thesis is defined as a social identity that defines groups by their belief in a myth of common 
heritage and geographical origins and by their shared language, rituals, and dress. Note the similarities between 
this use of ethnicity and European notions of ‘nationality’ – an indication of the influence of European modernity 
on African conceptions of social identity. 
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behaviour were necessary to establish people’s ethnicity61. The most important marker of 
ethnicity is language: the Hausa language marks a Hausa-Fulani ethnicity, while every non-
indigenous ethnic group has its own language. In Kano City every PS respondent spoke 
Hausa, against a mere 35% in Sabon Gari, none of whom as a first language; a majority in 
Sabon Gari only spoke their ethnic mother tongue and (pidgin) English62. Other markers of 
ethnic difference include dress, such as the northern long dress and cap, and physical 
characteristics.  
Both religion and occupation are usually considered to be affiliative, and thus flexible 
or integrative, identities. However, this view places undue emphasis on individual freedom by 
overlooking social pressures and institutional inequalities that socialise or even force people 
into certain religious and occupational categories. In Kano, religion is highly politicised and 
therefore both Christians, Muslims and their respective authorities are highly averse to people 
changing faiths. However, there may be a difference between religious boundaries within 
‘settler’ communities and those between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’: the PS showed roughly 70% 
of the respondents in Kano City having friends (almost) exclusively from their own ethnicity, 
religion, and state, against roughly 8% in Sabon Gari. These findings are a measure of the 
level of segregation between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, but can also be interpreted as evidence 
for harder religious and ethnic boundaries between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ than within the 
‘settler’ communities. As section 4.3 will show, there is considerable evidence for the 
hypothesis that from the early 1980s, inter-religious tensions came to dominate social identity 
construction, rather than intra-Muslim ones. Similarly, in terms of occupation, although 
everyone is nominally free to choose a certain occupation, structural inequalities on the basis 
of ethnic and religious access to education render this freedom more rhetorical than real. 
                                                
61 The difficulty of recognising ethnic or religious groups is painfully exemplified by ‘selection procedures’ of 
reciting Quranic verses, speaking Hausa, or wearing northern dress, during the violent riot in 2004.  






All four identities that constitute the ‘native’-
’settler’ divide are thus hard-bounded and the sum of 
these identities is larger than its constituent parts: ethnic 
and religious oppositions are stronger between ‘natives’ 
and ‘settlers’ than within the ‘settler’ communities. Both 
findings are illustrated further by the PS data on 
marriage preferences presented in figure 4.3 and 4.4. Marriage is an effective social 
mechanism to create alliances between different identity groups and thus weaken their 
boundaries and animosities. Marriage preferences are a proxy for the willingness of different 
identity groups to integrate (Wilson-Fall 2000: 62). Figure 4.3 shows that in Kano roughly 
50% of the population has objections against certain marriage partners for their daughters. It 
also shows that there are significantly fewer objections in Sabon Gari. The groups that 















Figure 4.3: Objections to Marriage Daughter to Certain Social Groups 
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Figure 4.4: Groups Objected to as Marriage Partners for Daughters 
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Several patterns in this graph are of importance to this thesis. First, the categories of 
which Kano City respondents were most averse were, in order of importance: non-Muslims, 
non-Hausa, Fulani63, Yoruba and Christians. Apart from the Fulani, all of those categories fit 
the cleavage between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, indicating the hardness of the boundaries 
between these groups. Secondly, respondents in Sabon Gari objected most to Hausa, people 
from different ethnic groups in general, and Igbo specifically. From these, only their objection 
to Hausa fits the cleavage between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’; the other two reflect ethnic 
tensions within the ‘settler’ community. It can therefore be tentatively concluded that 
although religion and ethnicity are equally important in the self-perceptions of ‘natives’ and 
‘settlers’, ‘natives’ tend to view ‘settlers’ in terms of religion, while ‘settlers’ see ‘natives’ 
more in ethnic terms. 
 
4.3 Historical Construction of Social Identity in Kano 
From the wide range of disciplines concerned with identity, the work on ethnicity and 
nationalism provides the best analytical starting point to discuss the historical construction of 
social identity in Kano. With regard to ethnicity, Lonsdale rightly argues that most theories 
can be divided into two camps. On the one hand, there are those perspectives which Lonsdale 
calls “defensive scholarly imaginations of the tribe” (1994: 131), and on the other, the more 
recent scholarship that emphasises the constructed or ‘imagined’ nature of ethnicity and its 
similarities to nationalism. The latter, social-constructivist perspective has profited greatly 
from the works of Anderson (2006), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983; 1992), and Vail (1989), 
all of whom argue that the social categories of nationalism and ethnicity have been created, 
invented, or imagined in a historical process of identity construction. Specifically on Nigeria, 
Post and Vickers (1973), Cohen (1969), and Melson and Wolpe (1970; 1971) show that ethnic 
                                                
63 Because this question was open-ended, Hausa-Fulani in the graph comprises the answers Hausa, Fulani, and 
Hausa-Fulani. Respondents in Kano City objected to specifically rural Fulani, whilst people in Sabon Gari 
objected more generally to their daughter marrying any Hausa. 
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loyalties were essentially political and “that modernisation, far from destroying 
communalism, both reinforces communal conflict and creates the conditions for the formation 
of entirely new groups” (Melson and Wolpe 1970: 1113). Individual emphases differ, and 
many of the limitations of their work have been discussed and partly redressed by later 
analysts (e.g. Ranger 1994: 9-50), but the idea of the constructed and political nature of 
identity has become widely accepted. Contemporary Nigerian social identities were neither 
completely imposed by the colonial rulers, nor a reproduction of atavistic African tradition; in 
Ranger’s words,  
“European classifications of race, or tribe, or language […] created a series of 
empty boxes, with bounded walls but without contents. […] Whites could [only] 
suggest some very basic meanings derived from simplifications of African history 
or from industrial and urban occupational stereotypes” (Ranger 1994: 27).  
 
The external dimensions of social identities in Africa were thus largely enforced by the 
colonial rulers; internal meanings, however, remained a matter of internal African struggle. In 
many ways, these internal meanings were the product of a process of ‘bricolage’, the 
construction of new ideas and adapted constructs from existing ‘building blocks’ (Derrida and 
Bass 2001: 278-94; Lévi-Strauss 1996: 19). Sketching the historical development of the 
‘native’-‘settler’ cleavage in Kano this section demonstrates that, while pre-colonial Kano 
was characterised by inclusive territorial identities and conflict resolution, the two categories 
became exclusionary during the colonial and early post-colonial period. 
 
4.3.1 Social Identity in Pre-colonial Kano 
Through the migration of Fulani and other northern ethnic groups into Kano City during the 
Maguzawa period, Kano developed as a plural society (1000-1500 AD) (Paden 1970: 251). 
Since then, definitions of ‘native’ and ‘stranger’ have been in constant change. Initially, the 
non-Muslim Maguzawa were the native inhabitants of Kano, but Muslim Hausas took over 
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this role with the spread of Islam and the increase of trade. With the Fulani Jihad, the 
victorious Fulani ruling class was incorporated into the category of ‘natives’. The Jihad 
spread and intensified a pan-ethnic Islam both in urban and rural areas of the Caliphate and its 
central practice of slave raiding assimilated large numbers of ‘strangers’ into Kano society 
(Lubeck 1986: 17) – conversion was thus a means of integration (King 2001: 357).  
There is also evidence that the pre-colonial categories of ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’ were 
more open and flexible than their modern incarnations. This argument is generally made for 
most of pre-colonial Africa: ethnic identities in pre-colonial Africa were not like modern 
conceptions of the ‘billiard ball’ nation-states, but could be “formed and reformed by fission 
and fusion, like slivers of glass in a kaleidoscope” (Lonsdale 1994: 137) and co-exist in non-
zero sum competition. Mustapha’s analysis of Rogo (1998: 30-31), a rural town in the south-
west of Kano state, shows that in pre-Jihad Kano identities of ethnicity, linguistic background 
(Hausa), and territorial loyalty (Kanawa) could interact and create an inclusive society for 
most northern Muslim ethnic groups. Ethnic and religious distinctions were therefore often 
blurred (2001: 357).  
Based on Mustapha (1998: 33-36) and Olaniyi (2004: 90-93), it is argued here that 
these inclusive identities were partly due to constructive conflict resolution by the Kano 
Emirate: traditional rulers were liberal towards immigrants and accorded them the exalted 
status of guests, because of the vital role of immigrants in Kano’s economy. Osaghae (1994), 
however, takes a wholly different view in seeking to demonstrate a historical continuity in 
Kano’s discriminatory policy towards non-Muslim non-indigenes (Osaghae 1994: 26-27). 
Although it may be true that Muslim ethnic groups integrated more easily into pre-colonial 
Kano than non-Muslims, the division between the walled city (birni) and the immigrant 
neighbourhoods outside the walls (waje) was not as strict as Osaghae opines. Paden (1970: 
257) provides demographic data of Kano City in 1931, which shows that there were 
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minorities of migrant Yoruba living inside the City during the colonial period. Thus, strangers 
in Kano were seen in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language, but there were ways in which 
these strangers could integrate and become Kanawa. A combination of economic growth, 
hospitable state policy, and a pan-ethnic Islam constructed social identities of ‘natives’ and 
‘settlers’ as integrative rather than exclusionary. 
 
4.3.2 Social Identity in Kano under Colonial and Early Post-Colonial Rule (1904-1982) 
Although British rule did not mark the end of Africa’s tradition of identity formation, as 
Vansina argues, it did add new factors to the process (Ranger 1994: 19-20). Although it is 
impossible to do justice to the myriad ways in which social identities reacted to these factors, 
this section seeks to illustrate how colonial and early post-colonial rule in Kano hardened the 
boundaries of the inclusive pre-colonial identities and laid the foundations for contemporary 
social conflict. Two separate dynamics of identity construction will be discussed here, one 
within the northern Muslim community in Kano, and the other between the Muslim and non-
Muslim communities. Within the Muslim community in Kano, the British pledge not to 
become involved in religious matters led to a rise of Islam (Kane 2003: 34-35) and to a 
process of de-emphasising differences between northern Muslim ethnic groups (Lubeck 1986: 
303). This trend was compounded by national politics around independence, which developed 
the idea of the north as a community: “one north, one people, under one God” (Mustapha 
1998: 40). Southerners viewed all Muslims from the north as northerners, or ‘Hausas’, which 
affected the northerners’ self-perceptions. Hausa came to mark ‘northern-ness’, fusing the 
Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups into a single ethnic category (Mustapha 1998: 40; Paden 
1973: 355).  
These integrative trends were cross-cut, however, by the intensification of class 
conflict. Indirect rule aimed for the maintenance of the political status-quo-ante colonialism, 
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which meant British support for the Native Authority to remain in power. The lack of 
downward accountability of the Native Authority hardened both class and ethnic divisions 
between Fulani rulers and the talakawa (commoners) (Lubeck 1986: 29; Wakili 1997: 38). 
Class identities also became more important due to growth of the urban talakawa class 
(Lubeck 1986: 36). Urbanisation “into the land of plenty” (Wakili 1997: 52), both from 
northern and southern Nigeria, increased due to Kano’s central role in the colonial groundnut 
industry and the large-scale development plans in the post-colonial oil boom. Together with 
high birth rates, this accounts for the immense growth rate of Kano in the second half of the 
20th century: from 260,000 in 1964 to about 5 million in 2006, an average increase of over 6% 
per year (Paden 1973: 18).  
From the 1950s, class identities were translated into politics through NEPU and the 
NPC (Lubeck 1986: 39). NEPU was the source of the ‘radical’ populist tradition in Kano 
propagating Islamic egalitarianism. Although it was defeated in the 1964 elections, NEPU 
“garnered many supporters of the heart” (Lubeck 1986: 39); until today, people in Kano speak 
proudly of the city’s radical Islamic-populist orientation: “In Kano politics, the dominant 
ideology is Aminu Kano’s radicalism, politics that sees itself as the protector of the weak and 
the poor”64. Politics, however, is not the only sphere in which Kano developed tensions 
between conservatives and radicals. Infrastructural development under the British not only 
increased contact between north and south Nigeria, but also between northern Muslims and 
the Middle East – not least through increasing numbers of Muslims going on hajj to Mecca. 
The Wahhabi influences from Saudi Arabia found fertile soil in a young cohort of mallamai, 
protesting against the dominance and the ‘non-Islamic’ ritual of the tariqas (Kane 2003: 70). 
Izala, inspired by “one of the most charismatic anti-Sufi reformists in twentieth-century West-
                                                
64 Dr Haruna Wakili, op. cit.  
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Africa” (Kane 2003: 82), Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, became the strongest of these radical 
reformist opponents of the traditional tariqas in Kano.  
Turning now to relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Kano; during the 
colonial period, the increased migration of mostly Christian Igbo and Christian and Muslim 
Yoruba challenged the Emirate system of social assimilation, a challenge that was 
compounded by the British policies of indirect rule and strict segregation of ‘natives’ and 
‘non-natives’. Because of British ultra-conservative indirect rule policies, they feared 
southern immigrants would increase tensions in Kano. The Kano sarauta class, in turn, sought 
to maintain its authority and protect Islam from the increasing influence of Christian 
missionaries (Osaghae 1994: 31-35). For these reasons, the British expanded the waje area 
outside the walled city of Kano, constructing Sabon Gari for southern and Tudun Wada for 
northern immigrants. This residential segregation was enforced by the political system, for 
Sabon Gari was under direct rule of the colonial government, while Kano City was governed 
by the Emirate (Albert 1999: 279), and by law, which prevented natives from living in Sabon 
Gari and non-Muslim men from marrying Muslim women (Paden 1970: 264). This forced 
southern immigrants to bring wives from their ‘home’ region and reinforced divisions on the 
basis of ‘native-ness’.  
In the early post-colonial period, segregation between northern ‘natives’ and southern 
‘settlers’ was continued through the NPC’s ‘northernisation policy’, which, after the ethnic 
riots of 1953, replaced southern Nigerians in public office with northerners (Albert 1994: 
118). To some extent, the north-south division was also reinforced by the new dynamics of 
national politics, where the northern, eastern, and western politicians competed to define the 
terms of an independent Nigeria. Religion became a factor of national importance as Islam 
became associated with the northern region (and to a much lesser extent with the western 
Yoruba) and Christianity with the south and east (Kane 2003: 34-38). Especially from the 
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1970s, when political competition between the religions, through the JNI and CAN, 
developed in response to the Nigerian membership of the OIC (Kane 2003: 183), inter-
denominational competition widened the gap between Kano’s ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. Class 
differentials compounded the cleavage between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. Most 
inhabitants of Sabon Gari have always been employed in the Sabon Gari market, as small 
entrepreneurs; however, because they are generally more highly educated than northerners65, 
many southerners also came to be employed in Kano’s growing industrial sector: “newcomers 
[and especially the Igbos] began to dominate the economy” (Wakili 1997: 47). This is 
exemplified by the fact that by 1965, Sabon Gari market surpassed Kano City market in 
number of traders, value of turnover, and the average profit per trader (Paden 1973: 317).  
In sum, the colonial and early post-colonial periods segmented the Muslim 
communities along class and ideological lines, while uniting them under the ‘Northern’ 
identity. Tensions between Muslim ‘natives’ and Christian ‘settlers, however, increased 
during this period. The development of riots in Kano can indicate the interaction between 
these two dynamics. In the 1950s and 1960s, riots occurred in Kano in 1953 and 1966, both of 
which saw mostly Igbo migrants targeted. It seems therefore that the most salient and 
exclusionary identities in the 1960s were reflections of the national dynamics between 
northern Hausa and south-eastern Igbos, infused with local economic inequalities. Social 
identities during the 1970s oil boom and economic expansion, however, were dominated by 
intra-Muslim cleavages of sectarianism, class, and politics. These tensions culminated in the 
1980 Maitatsine riot and the 1981 riot between NPN traditionalists and PRP radicals, both of 
which played out within the ‘native’ Kano community. From 1982, riots have resulted from 
tensions between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities, indicating the growing salience of 
this cleavage.  
                                                
65 Due to the influence of Christian missions in southern Nigeria. 
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4.4 Causes of the ‘Native’-‘Settler’ Conflict in Kano 
This section outlines the factors, or ‘root causes of conflict’, leading the process of social 
identity formation in Kano to result in the salient exclusionary identities of ‘native’ and 
‘settler’ since the early 1980s. The most important factors in this period have been: (i) the end 
of the oil boom and the Structural Adjustment Programme-led (SAP) economic crisis; (ii) the 
resulting population pressures, high rates of youth unemployment, and youth ‘street culture’; 
(iii) the ruthless and corrupt zero-sum politics during military rule in the 1980s and 1990s and 
its continuation in the current democratic dispensation; (iv) the introduction in the constitution 
of ‘legal indigeneity’, granting rights to sub-national autochtony; and (v) the introduction of 
Sharia. These factors exacerbated existing tensions between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ and are 
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In Kano, Nigeria’s economic crisis that began in the late 1970s (Olukoshi 1991: 28-33, 
73) had a profound effect on the existing tensions between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. Horizontal  
inequalities, in terms of occupation, income, and education, became more poignant – the 
relative wealth of Sabon Gari’s ‘immigrants’ posing a serious grievance to Kano’s ‘native’ 
population. Figures 4.5 to 4.7 present the most important indicators of the economic 
horizontal inequalities between Kano City and Sabon Gari. Figure 4.5 depicts the highest 
level of education attained by each respondent and shows that although Kano City has 
significantly more Islamic-educated people and equals Sabon Gari in the secondary education, 
Sabon Gari has almost twice as many people with a tertiary qualification or degree.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 points towards two grievances: on the one hand, ‘natives’ feel that ‘settlers’ 
are taking ‘their money’ through successful entrepreneurship and lower unemployment, while 
on the other ‘settlers’ feel discriminated against because the public sector, and hence political 





















Figure 4.6: Occupation of Respondents in Kano City and Sabon Gari 
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discrimination in the public sector has led to the degeneration of their neighbourhood66. Paden 
mentions the Kano Twenty-Year-Plan of 1965, which describes Sabon Gari as “overcrowded 
and uniformly dirty and untidy” (1971: 131); from my limited experience in both areas it 
seems that Sabon Gari is overcrowded and that especially its infrastructure is worse than that 
of Kano City. 
  
 
Figure 4.7 presents a more or less objective indicator of wealth: the number of certain 
types of commodities in the household67. The pattern depicted shows that Kano City has a 
more unequal division of wealth than Sabon Gari: more relative poverty, less ‘middle class’ 
households, and over twice as many relatively rich households. This pattern correlates 
significantly with people’s self-perceptions of relative wealth68 and shows that although there 
are more relatively wealthy indigenes, most people in Kano City are (and feel that they are) 
worse off than most people in Sabon Gari. This horizontal inequality originated in the colonial 
and early post-colonial period, but became starker during the period of economic crisis. As a 
result, there is a large ‘underclass’ of uneducated, underemployed young ‘native’ males, who 
                                                
66 Prince Memayetan, journalist, 18 August 2006 in Kano 
67 The following commodities were included: radio, TV, refrigerator, motorbike, flush toilet, car, and video. 
68 Correlation of 0.5 at significance level of P<0.01.  


















‘hang out’ on the street all day viewed by many as “soldiers”69 ready to use violence for 
whoever pays them. They are poor: the successful ones earn around $3 a day through ‘fuel 
hawking’, driving an achaba (motorbike taxi), or petty trading; the unfortunate have to beg to 
feed themselves.  
 It is here that politics as a ‘root cause’ of conflict enters the hypothetical story. Most 
interviewees point to politics as the main cause of conflict in Kano. There are three main ways 
in which politics exacerbates social conflict and its violent escalation. First, political parties in 
Kano are segmented into ‘houses’, systems of personal loyalty towards individual politicians. 
Nominally, these ‘houses’ have distinct ideologies, but in practice they are based on favours, 
payment and personal loyalties70:  
“These houses are not families, they are followers of political mentors, more or 
less like a school of thought, but not really because there is no written-down 
philosophy. However, the trend of their political behaviours and beliefs tend to be 
like a school of thought. […]. They go all the way from the state level down to the 
grass roots. And each house is struggling for either the party or the executive 
control of the state. Sometimes there are killings or injuries…” 71 
 
 Secondly, some of the youths are organised as Yandaba or Yantauri, youth gangs that 
originated in the 1950s as body guards for NEPU (Dan-Asabe 1991: 89). Competing Yandaba 
groups often clash violently72. They have also been an integral part of Kano politics in the 
Second Republic and the current democratic dispensation73. As one fuel hawker, who belongs 
to the youth group of the PDP, said:  
“When we go to the campaign, we paint ourselves and bring a lot of weapons. 
[…] Knives, big sticks… During the campaigns, we use them when we meet the 
opposition parties. We will fight against them.”74 
 
                                                
69 Prince Memayetan, op. cit.  
70 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit. 
71 Ibid. 
72 E.g during my fieldwork in September 2006 and around the 2007 elections (Abdullahi 2006; Madu-West and 
Nmeribeh 2007). 
73 For examples of this dynamic in the 2007 national elections, see e.g. Dowden (2007).  
74 Anonymous (iv), fuel hawker, 15 August 2006 in Kano  
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Thirdly, unemployed youths can be paid by opposition politicians to initiate violence 
during peaceful demonstrations (IPCR 2003: 312). Although it is difficult to find 
conclusive evidence for this dynamic, every interviewee I asked stated that this was 
common practice in Kano75. Section 5.2 will address this issue in more detail for the riot 
of 2004. 
 Local politics, however, are a reflection of national political culture, which 
became increasingly corrupt, repressive, and based on group and personal loyalties rather 
than ideological competition during the military dictatorships leading up to the Abacha 
years (1993-1998) (Olukoshi 1991: 34). As both Falola (2004: 149) and Mustapha (2004: 
257) show, the return of democracy did not ‘de-ethnicise’ or stabilise the process of 
political competition. The debate preceding the 2007 presidential elections is a case in 
point: newspaper editorials argued over the origins of the next President, rather than his 
suitability for office. Such competition is translated to the local level and reinforces 
ethnic and religious oppositions between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in Kano.  
 Another important factor constructing the ‘native’-‘settler’ cleavage is the 
introduction of indigeneity into the Nigerian constitution. Because this constitutional 
distinction between ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’ is based on whether or not 
someone’s “parents or any [of their] grandparents were members of a community 
indigenous to that state”, a migrant family cannot become fully recognised members their 
host state. Non-indigenes are discriminated against in educational opportunities, public 
sector occupation and pensions (Mustapha 1998: 48-49), practices reminiscent of the 
colonial segregation of ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’. 
 From the 1980s onwards, two trends were discernible in the development of 
religious identities in Kano. On the one hand, different cleavages within the Islamic 
                                                
75 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit.; Anonymous (ii), op. cit. 
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community softened, to the extent that today “Kano Muslims are one”76. On the other, 
cleavages between Muslims and Christians intensified and hardened. Explaining these 
processes, Kane (2003: 204-06, 26) argues that within the Kano Muslim community, the 
increased “regulation of the spiritual economy” and internal power struggles of Izala 
enhanced integrative Muslim identities after 1980. In the Christian communities, Kane 
shows that younger, Western educated elites acquired a strong political awareness and 
were determined to break the political hegemony of the Nigerian Muslims (2003: 204). In 
Kano, this is clearly exemplified by the militant evangelical character of many Sabon 
Gari churches, such as the ‘Aggressive Evangelical Church – Gospel Warriors’, and the 
language of ‘crusades’ that is used in their advertisements. It was striking that while most 
Muslims I interviewed acknowledged that Allah and God were in essence the same and 
that Christians and Muslims were brothers, many Christians denied this77. Within both 
CAN and the JNI, the highly politicised leadership of Archbishop Akogie and Sheikh 
Gumi also increased the political competition between the two communities on national 
and local levels (Kane 2003: 205). 
 Two final factors can be added to this analysis: the introduction of Sharia in the 
northern states in 2000 and the intensification of the discourse of a global struggle 
between the (Christian) West and the Islamic world. To discuss the full impact of Sharia 
on northern Nigeria is beyond the purpose of this thesis, but one of its effects has 
certainly been increasing intra-denominational cohesion and an intensified cleavage 
between Muslims and Christians. The fact that, like under colonial rule, two separate 
                                                
76 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit. 
77 e.g. Sheikh Qaribullah, op. cit.; Reverend Jebis, op. cit. See also a 2004 BBC poll on religious perceptions in 
10 different countries (ICM 2004), which shows not only that Nigeria is the most religious country in the sample 
(which also includes Indonesia, Israel and the US), but also that 94% of the respondents felt that “my God is the 
only true God”. 
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legal systems exist78 reinforces residential, socio-economic, and political segregation in 
Kano. In the eyes of many non-indigenes, the introduction of Sharia has made Kano 
formally into a Muslim state, reinforcing their perceptions of being ‘guests’. Similarly, 
most Kanawa are very aware of the global politics and the US attitude towards Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and other ‘Muslim countries’. Whether or not there is in fact a ‘war between 
the West and Islam’, many Kanawa feel that their religious brethren are systematically 
targeted by contemporary Western imperialism. This has not only affected their view of 
Westerners in a negative way but also intensified the tensions between Muslim and 
Christian Nigerians.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that social conflict in Kano is caused by the 
construction of salient, exclusionary identities that distinguish between ‘natives’ and 
‘settlers’. This distinction is complex and flexible, a composite of ethnicity, religion, 
legal ‘indigeneity’ and class. In pre-colonial Kano there were distinctions between native 
and ‘settler’ and they were also defined in terms of ethnicity, religion, and class. 
However, several factors made them integrative rather than exclusionary. This changed in 
the colonial and early post-colonial period, when increased contact, modernisation and a 
population boom coincided with strictly conservative and divisive policies, which 
continued after independence. Early independence saw the emergence of ethno-regional 
national politics and the civil war, while post-war identities were based on intra-Muslim 
cleavages of sect, class and politics. After the collapse of the Second Republic and the 
end of the oil boom, however, divisions between natives and ‘settlers’ became re-
emphasised, due to economic crisis coinciding with horizontal inequalities, high numbers 
                                                
78 Christians can choose on a case-by-case basis which legal system they prefer; interestingly, many of them 
choose Sharia because of its efficient and fair courts (Dr Mustapha Ismail, director CHRI, 17 August 2006).  
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of unemployed ‘native’ youths, ethnic and religious politics, and the introduction of legal 
indigeneity and Sharia. These factors together provide some explanation why, in the early 
21st century, the social cleavage of ‘native’ versus ‘settler’ has been both salient and 
exclusionary. Building on this analysis, chapter 5 will now compare the riots in May 
2004 and the non-violent protests in February 2006, explaining the variance in their 
levels of violence. 
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5  INTERPRETING VIOLENCE 
 
5.1 Introduction: Conflict Escalation as Collective Action 
This chapter seeks to explain why the Plateau crisis in May 2004 led to collective violence in 
Kano, while the global crisis over the Danish cartoons of Prophet Muhammad two years later 
resulted only in peaceful protests and collective non-violent action. Analytically, collective 
violence and non-violence are two sides of the same coin: both are forms of strategic 
escalations of antagonistic inter-group relations. They are also, however, expressive acts, 
through which certain messages are communicated in a symbolic, culturally constructed 
language (Blok 2001: 103-15). Violence and non-violence therefore have instrumental and 
symbolic characteristics and can be analysed in reference to inter-group grievances and shared 
systems of cultural meaning. In the case of Kano, the social conflict between ‘natives’ and 
‘settlers’ has been proposed as a framework for such explanations. However, this framework 
cannot explain how, at a specific time and place, a large number of people decide to take 
action. Following Brass (2003: 12) and Schock (2005: 24-33), this chapter will address this 
issue and use theories of political process and collective action, developed most notably by 
Tilly (2003), Tarrow and McAdam (1982; 2000), to explain the variance between violence 
and non-violence in the two cases of escalation in Kano. 
 In social movement theory, “instances of popular struggle typically emerge as 
products of dynamic interactions between various parties to the conflict whose mutual 
orientation to each other defines a fluid, and socially constructed, field of contention” 
(McAdam and Tarrow 2000: 149). The link between this field of contention, or social 
conflict, and collective action requires the presence of three factors: justification, 
mobilisation, and a (perceived) opportunity (Horowitz 2002: 552; Schock 2005: 25-33). A 
justification consists of the collective perception that the actions taken are somehow 
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warranted. It usually consists of a mix of local or individual grievances, opportunistic interests 
and grander structural injustices, such as those outlined in section 4.4. Justifications are often 
strengthened by ‘triggering events’, which can activate identity boundaries (Tilly 2003: 21) if 
they are translated into categories of the social conflict. Violence is then framed in terms of 
‘necessary self-defence’ or ‘just retaliation’ for the triggering events. Justifications are best 
understood from the viewpoint of the participants: rather than an analytical view of a bounded 
episode of collective action, their ‘ontology’ is one of continuity. Their action is justified in 
relation to past or future actions and therefore part of a continuing struggle against injustice or 
danger (Horowitz 2002: 555).  
 Collective action also requires successful mobilisation. Analytically, a distinction is 
made between network-based and setting-based mobilisation. Firstly, network-based 
mobilisation occurs through networks and organisations that connect individuals to aggregate 
and coordinate political and social action. As Schock argues, “partly autonomous and 
contextually rooted organisations that are linked by connective structures and coordinated by 
formal organisations” (Schock 2005: 29) create the best balance between organisational 
robustness and flexibility that is needed for effective mobilisation.  ‘Connective structures’ in 
this usage refers to the potential for brokerage, that is the mechanism of connecting two 
formerly unconnected individuals, groups, or organisations (Tilly 2003: 21). Brokerage is 
intimately linked to the activation and de-activation of identity boundaries, depending on how 
it interacts with existing salient identity cleavages. Secondly, setting-based mobilisation 
occurs if particular events in themselves initiate or enhance the mechanisms of brokerage, 
boundary activation, and mobilisation. Although analytically separate, network-based and 
setting-based interaction often function in concert, as will be shown in the two cases below. 
 People need not only a justification to mobilise for collective action, but also an 
assessment that the action has a good chance of achieving its goals and that the risks of the 
71 
 
collective action are substantially reduced (Horowitz 2002: 524). These perceptions are 
captured in the term opportunity, which denotes a certain point in time or a structural set-up 
that people perceive as an ‘opening’ for agency. Temporal opportunities provide such an 
opening in a particular setting within a limited timeframe and are therefore determinants of 
setting-based mobilisation; structural opportunities exist because of structural tensions, 
weaknesses, and contradictions within authoritative structures, most notably the state (O'Brien 
and Li 2006: 27-31). Opportunity affects collective action only if it is perceived as such; 
theoretically, it is possible that people mobilise on a perceived opportunity that does not exist. 
In assessing opportunities, it is also important to disaggregate the perceived opportunities 
arising from a particular situation: peaceful protesters, for example, perceive the opportunity 
of a demonstration and the actions it allows for differently from ‘specialists of violence’ (Tilly 
2003: 34-41).   
 Together, these three processes provide a model to compare the escalations of May 
2004 and February 2006 in Kano. The two sections below discuss the different stages of the 
escalation process, for each case, and show how justifications, mobilisation, and opportunities 
can help understand their particular outcomes.  
 
5.2 May 2004: Rioting in Kano 
Kano has a long history of violent riots, which can be traced back to the dynastic crisis of the 
Emirate in 1893 (Wakili 1997: 1). In contrast to the city’s historical record, popular 
perception holds that these episodes were caused by factors external to Kano society. The case 
of May 2004 seems to provide evidence to support this relation: the peaceful demonstration 
and subsequent riots of May 11 were certainly a reaction to the violence in Plateau state 
earlier that month: “on May 2 and 3 [2004], large numbers of well-armed Christians 
surrounded the town of Yelwa [in Plateau state] and killed around seven hundred  Muslims” 
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(HRW 2005: 1). These killings, compounded by the absence of state security forces, sparked 
an angry reaction in Kano that resulted in a violent riot on May 11. It therefore seems this 
violence was triggered by external factors; however, the mechanisms through which this 
occurred betray the importance of local grievances between Muslim ‘natives’ and Christian 
‘settlers’. The Plateau crisis triggered violence because it was translated into the local social 
conflict between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, as discussed in chapter 479. This interpretation 
framed mobilisation and justifications for protest as part of the struggle between ‘native’ 
Muslims and ‘settler’ Christians, activated religious identity boundaries, and triggered deeply 
felt grievances80 between the two communities.  
The patterns of network-based mobilisation indicate this ‘local’ interpretation of the 
Plateau crisis. At the lowest level of aggregation, mobilisation and justification occurred 
around mosques, where local imams preached against the injustices of Yelwa. In an interview 
with HRW (2005: 58), Governor Shekarau estimated that 90% of the sermons during the 
escalation process were on the topic of the Plateau crisis. Networks of Islamic religious ritual 
thus became vehicles of mass mobilisation and justification; Islamic leaders initiated and 
fostered the religious discourse through angry sermons (HRW 2005: 59) and simply because 
they responded, rather than other authorities. A young fuel hawker, who wanted to partake in 
the fighting but was kept at home by his family, explains the justification of his friends and 
his imam: “if a person kills three people, he who kills that person has avenged those three. In 
Islam, […] this is good.”81 Reactions of local and national media, which often uncritically 
                                                
79 It is assumed here that the data from the PS collected in the summer of 2006 reflect the social conflict situation 
before the riots in 2004, based on the fact that the majority of the respondents in the PS felt that their views of 
other ethnic and religious groups had remained the same or improved over the past 5 years. In Kano City, 90% 
of the respondents felt that their ethnicity and religion were equally or more important to them as in 2000, whilst 
only 13% thought their views on other ethnic and religious groups had worsened. In Sabon Gari, these 
percentages were 69% and 2%, respectively. This indicates that the data collected in 2006 is likely to under- 
rather than overestimate the tensions between the different identity groups in 2004. It is however acknowledged 
that the assumption is far from perfect and ignores the essentially dynamic nature of social identities. 
80 See sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
81 Anonymous (iv), op. cit.  
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framed the Plateau crisis in religious terms, also contributed to a ‘Muslims-versus-Christians’ 
discourse in Kano. 
Through the brokerage of the Ulama, Kano’s most respected mallamai, these local 
mobilisations were connected and integrated into a larger movement. The success of the 
Ulama in this process was dependent, as Tarrow (2005: 29) hypothesised, on its 
organisational flexibility and moral authority in the eyes of Kano Muslims. The Ulama as a 
group does not take part in the competition for followership between the Sufi Brotherhoods 
and the reformers and is respected solely because of the knowledge of its members. Their 
appeal for protest can therefore broker links between Muslims of all denominations. This 
mobilisation within the ‘native’ Muslim community activated identity boundaries between 
Muslim ‘natives’ and Christian ‘settlers’. The victims of Yelwa came to be seen as fellow-
Muslims, rather than for example fellow-Nigerians, and their suffering was blamed on the 
Christians. The intensity of this reaction was exacerbated because at least 500 refugees from 
Plateau state were housed in Sharada and Ja’en quarters, where many ‘native’ inhabitants 
have historical ethnic origins in Plateau state (HRW 2005: 57-58). Inhabitants of Sharada and 
Ja’en therefore felt personally connected to the suffering of the refugees82.  
 Mobilisation, however, did not occur exclusively in Islamic networks. Both the 
government (Kazaure 2004: 2) and some of the interviewees83 have argued that in preparation 
for the demonstration on May 11, politicians mobilised young supporters and paid them to 
destabilise the situation. Two structural opportunities can explain the incentive for such 
political action: first, the political consequences for the incumbent Governor if the peaceful 
demonstration would escalate into violence; and second, the well-known tensions between 
Governor Shekarau (ANPP) and President Obasanjo (PDP). Competition between these two 
levels of the state, based on competing claims for jurisdiction and inter-party tensions, was 
                                                
82 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit. 
83 Ibid.  
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expressed in the Governor’s refusal to heed the advice of the President and the police against 
the demonstration. In their public correspondence after the riots, the Governor and the 
President underlined their differences in a mutual attempt to shift the blame onto each other 
(Obasanjo 2004; Shekarau 2004).  
 The next stage of escalation began with the start of the demonstration from the Aliyu 
Ibn Talib mosque on Zaria Road and ended two days later after the heavy-handed intervention 
of federal security forces. The demonstration was organised by the Ulama, who had officially 
requested permission from the Governor. It started with a prayer session at the mosque, after 
which several thousand people were led to the Government House with a letter to the 
Governor outlining an ultimatum to the President: if the Plateau crisis was not resolved in 
seven days, the consequences would be his (HRW 2005: 58-59). Violence began towards the 
end of the demonstration, around noon, most notably in Sharada, Panshekara, Dorayi, Ja’en 
and other areas south of BUK Road. To what extent this violence was planned or spontaneous 
is a difficult, but important question. The role of political opponents of the incumbent 
Governor has already been discussed, but the role and responsibility of the Islamic leaders in 
the violence is a more complex issue. On the one hand, it is argued that violence would not 
have occurred if Islamic leaders had not mobilised the people strengthening their justification: 
“If the leaders are not behind them, those under them will not have the boldness of doing 
that.”84 Most sources, however, vehemently oppose this claim and argue that if anything, it 
was an honest miscalculation on the part of the Ulama85.  
 The evidence does not support either of these extreme claims. Firstly, it is important to 
acknowledge differences between Islamic leaders: although all Islamic leaders answered to 
the call for protest, some may have incited anger through ‘fiery preachings’, while others 
emphasised the importance of prayer and support for the survivors rather than retaliation. 
                                                
84 Reverend Jebis, op. cit.  
85 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit. 
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Secondly, the fact that violence began in a different part of the city from where the 
demonstration was held indicates that there may not have been a direct link between the two 
events. However, it is also true that Islamic leaders denounced the killings in Yelwa because 
Muslims were killed and therefore presented the issue as part of the continuing struggle 
between Muslims and Christians. As Gwarzo argued,  
“…it is a revenge thing, it is a reaction. And if the reaction was not meant to be 
violent, they would not have called [the demonstration]. There are other ways in 
which you can take it calmly, and appease them. Why now call for a 
demonstration? Why now call for a prayer? […] They knew they could not control 
it, nobody could”.86 
 
Muslims and their leaders were angry because they felt ‘brothers’ had been hurt. A collective 
prayer session, in which tens of thousands of Muslims ritually reaffirm their collective 
religious identity is a powerful ‘bonding’ event even without a justification for collective 
anger; if this ritual is dedicated to and especially called for the suffering of fellow Muslims, it 
has a huge mobilising and escalatory potential87. The tone of the ultimatum to the President 
supports this view, because its implicit threat is that of violence. Violence, although perhaps 
not planned by Islamic leaders, was thus constructed as a legitimate option in the repertoire of 
reactions against the injustices of the Plateau crisis. 
 Both the morning prayer and the demonstration to the Government House are 
examples of setting-based mobilisation, mobilising people formerly unconnected. Such 
events, as Gwarzo said, are difficult to control, because they provide a diverse range of 
temporary opportunities to different actors. Apart from opposition politicians and religious 
leaders, a mass demonstration feared to become violent provides an opportunity to loot for the 
many unemployed youths and almajirai88. This mechanism, which many authorities refer to 
                                                
86 Dr Tahir Gwarzo, op. cit.  
87 Traditionally, special prayers were only called if the community was in grave danger, for example if the rains 
did not come, and therefore have very serious connotations.  




as “hijacking of a peaceful protest”89, is due to a temporary opportunity for ‘specialists in 
violence’: unemployed angry youth and criminals (Tilly 2003: 15-19). But where many attach 
the prime responsibility for the violence to these hooligans, I follow Wakili in arguing that 
they are peripheral to the larger process of conflict escalation (Wakili 1997: 233), because the 
demography and nature of the violence of the 2004 riot, although reaffirming the multiplicity 
of actors and incentives, indicates the centrality of the existing social conflict. 
 The demography of the violence on May 11 and 12 is shows links between existing 
causes of social conflict and the dynamics of escalation. In past riots, much of the violence 
was concentrated on the streets around Sabon Gari and its market. Indigenous youths no 
longer enter Sabon Gari since the Igbos took to arming themselves in anticipation of riots 
since the 1980s; violence is therefore confined to the borders between the conflicting 
communities. Other hotspots are usually areas where ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities 
interact90. Sharada, Ja’en, and the other industrial neighbourhoods had never before 
experienced riot violence. During the 2004 riot looting occurred, but eye witnesses held that 
this was incidental to the killing (HRW 2005: 60). The dominance of killing is difficult to 
explain from the ‘vagabonds thesis’, even though the industrial neighbourhoods harbour many 
unemployed youths. Grievances created by the economic horizontal inequalities between the 
Hausa Muslims and southern immigrants in the area provide a better explanation. Although 
the former group is the majority both in the entire city and the neighbourhood, most of the 
employment in the factories is taken up by southern immigrants, because of their higher 
education91. This grievance caused many unemployed young men of Sharada and surrounding 
neighbourhoods to take the opportunity for revenge against their migrant neighbours92.  
                                                
89 Tafidan Kura, op. cit. 
90 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit. 
91 See section 4.4 
92 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit. 
77 
 
 Although the economic grievance was particularly strong in the areas around Sharada, 
violence in other neighbourhoods shows remarkable similarities, occurring mainly in areas 
with a heterogeneous population or on the borders between homogeneous communities. The 
majority of culprits were young men, aged generally between 15 and 30, with many of them 
unemployed. Weapons used included machetes, knives, an occasional home-made gun, and 
fuel (HRW 2005: 60). Both killing and looting occurred, supporting the view of multiple 
actors and motives, but the way in which victims were selected betrays the impact of the 
‘native’-‘settler’ conflict on the violence. Victims were chosen on the basis of their clothing, 
language or accent, or were asked to recite phrases from the Quran to prove their faith93 
(HRW 2005: 62-73) . Based on these patterns, it is feasible to argue that although looting and 
‘opportunistic violence’ was a motivation for some of the violent youth, the demography, 
nature of the violence, and victim selection methods point towards a trend of ‘coordinated 
destruction’ of ‘settlers’ and their property94.  
 Because part of the problem in Yelwa had been the absence of security forces, the 
government reacted forcefully to the crisis in Kano by means of a ‘shoot-on-sight’ order to the 
police (Civil Society 2004: 4). Although many newspapers credited the government for this 
“swift and decisive” action, HRW criticised the “brutal response of the police and the army” 
and its unprovoked, extrajudicial killings (HRW 2005: 73-79). Other actions controlling the 
violence included the Emir and Governor appealing to people on the radio for calm. By May 
14, the violence had effectively ended and by May 20 the city-wide curfew was lifted. In total, 
HRW (2005: 62-63) estimates that at least 250 people were killed and many more wounded 
and displaced. If we apply the contingency model to the escalations of 2004 and 2006, it is 
clear that the de-escalation stage of the Plateau riot has affected the ‘negative peace’ at the 
                                                
93 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit.; Femi Sodipo, op. cit. ; Dr Tahir Gwarzo, op. cit.  
94 As HRW rightly points out, there were many instances of heroism, in which Hausa Muslims warned their 
neighbours about the danger, smuggled them through ‘checkpoints’ wearing a headscarf, or protected groups of 
‘settlers’ in their own homes. This part of the story, although not directly relevant to the argument here, should 
not be ignored or forgotten. 
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start of the cartoon crisis. Therefore, tracing the process of non-violent escalation following 
the publication of the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in January and February 2006, the 
next section begins by considering the ways de-escalation in 2004 affected ‘peace’ in 2006. 
Subsequently, the discussion will focus on the patterns of justification, mobilisation, and 
opportunity to explain how later stages remained peaceful. 
 
5.3 February 2006: Peaceful Protest, Boycotts and Prayer 
Although riotous violence had been a characteristic of Kano society throughout the 20th 
century, the 2004 crisis made a significant impact on public awareness of the risks of violent 
outbreaks. Three possible reasons for this impact may have been widespread media attention 
for the crisis, not only within Nigeria but also in other parts of the world; the strong negative 
effect on the Kano economy, as investors withdrew capital from Kano industries in fear of 
further destruction; and the reaction of the federal government, which not only denounced the 
violence, but decreed that new eruptions of violence would be addressed with a state of 
emergency. The Kano Peace and Development Initiative (KAPEDI) Peace Forum held in 
September 2004 was one of the most rigorous and widely attended of a wide array of peace 
meetings and conferences that followed upon the Plateau crisis and will therefore be used as 
representative. KAPEDI analyses that produced the most practical recommendations were 
those pertaining to economic and educational problems propelling youths into violence and 
ethnic and religious tensions perceived as the heart of the conflict95 (KAPEDI 2006: 70-76).  
Three main strategies were applied to resolve these problems: the creation of early-
warning mechanisms, conflict resolution NGOs, and peace committees; capacity building and 
                                                
95 These two discourses can be traced to specific interests within Kano society. The discourse of youth violence 
supported the interests of the formal authorities and the traditional rulers, who emphasised that the crisis was not 
inherent to ‘their’ Kano and potentially displace the blame for the riots onto the federal government, which is 
thought to be primarily responsible for the economic problems that cause youth unemployment. The discourse of 
ethnic and religious intolerance was propagated by Sabon Gari ethnic associations and CAN, both of whom 
claimed victimhood for ‘their’ communities.  
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employment generation schemes for youths; and increased cooperation between non-
indigenous ethnic leaders, traditional rulers, and the state government. The impact of early-
warning mechanisms and peace committees is difficult to assess, but it is likely they 
contributed to an awareness of the risks of violence. Capacity building and employment 
generation for youths, both through NGOs like YEDA and Gidauniyar Alheri and through 
government schemes, have only been partially successful96. The schemes seem to have an 
effect, but the number of youths involved is small compared to the size of the problem. 
Economic crisis can only be tackled through state and national economic reform that, among 
others, addresses the problem of corruption.  
Increased cooperation between the state government, traditional authorities, and Sabon 
Gari ethnic associations, has certainly enhanced communications between ‘native’ and 
‘settler’ communities in Kano. Partly because of the Emir’s compassionate reaction to and 
(financial) support for non-indigenes during the 2004 riot, he has become widely respected 
both in Kano City and Sabon Gari, while the recent appointment of an Igbo as special advisor 
to Governor Shekarau has improved inter-group communication97. Cooperation between 
Christian and Muslim leaders has, however, despite several local and national inter-faith 
workshops, hardly increased after the 2004 riots98. Unlike the ethnic, traditional and formal 
authorities, there are no institutional links between Christian and Islamic authorities99. 
Explaining this trend would require further research, but two contributing factors have been 
the strength of intra-religious, vertical institutional linkages and the politicised nature of 
religious authorities at the national and state levels.  
 In spite of these developments, which are likely to have enhanced institutional and 
social relationships between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, the PS data and interviews show that 
                                                
96 Inusa Musa, researcher dRPC, 29 August 2006 in Kano.; Abdullahi Hassan, assistant-director Gidauniyar 
Alheri, 7 September 2006 in Kano 
97 Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit.; Anonymous (ii), op. cit. 
98 Asma’u Yahaya, national secretary MSO, 12 August 2006 in Kano; Reverend Jebis, op. cit. 
99 Reverend Jebis, op. cit. 
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Kano’s identity structure was exclusionary in 2006. The first stage of the escalation process of 
the cartoon crisis is therefore similar to 2004 in terms of the social conflict, but different in 
terms of institutional cooperation100. Like the riots in 2004, the second stage of the escalation 
process in February 2006 was triggered by external events: the reprints of the cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad in January 2006 in European newspapers. Published in September 2005 
in Denmark, it was only after reprints in other European countries that popular protest erupted 
around the world (BBC 2006). In Nigeria, 15 people were killed and churches burnt in 
Maiduguri, the capitol of north-eastern Borno state, but Kano, despite public fears, remained 
peaceful (Musa 2006). In Kano, both CAN and Islamic authorities of all denominations 
denounced the Danish cartoons as an insult by the secular Danish state, rather than 
interpreting it as an inter-religious matter (BBC 2006; Musa 2006). Following this 
interpretation, Kano members of parliament collectively burnt Danish and Norwegian flags in 
a protest against what they perceived as the transgressions of these countries (BBC 2006).  
On the basis of this interpretation, Islamic leaders and the state government promoted 
a response that was targeted at the Danish economy, rather than at local Christians. Through 
sermons, radio appearances on Freedom Radio101, newspaper articles, text messages and 
emails, Islamic and traditional leaders rallied Kanawa to boycott Danish products (Kazaure 
2006). The Kano state government, as well as private enterprises, cancelled contracts with 
Danish partners and banned the sale of Danish dairy products (Gwantu 2006). Unlike in 2004, 
existing grievances resulting from the ‘native’-‘settler’ conflict were therefore not invoked as 
justifications for violence, nor were ‘native’-‘settler’ identity boundaries activated; if 
anything, Muslims and Christians jointly protested against this insult of religion as a whole102.  
                                                
100 This would indicate support for Varshney’s hypothesis (see section 2.4); however, a closer look at the process 
of escalation will show that religious leaders, without institutional links, were more important in preventing 
violence than ethnic or traditional authorities.  
101 Dr Haruna Wakili, op. cit.  
102 It could be argued that cartoons are a less serious insult or threat than killings. This view, however, is falsified 
by the violent escalation in Maiduguri and difficult to defend theoretically as the only higher crime in Islam than 
81 
 
 Because the cartoons were not interpreted in terms of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ identities, 
the people of Kano were jointly mobilised against Denmark through formal and informal 
networks. Because the insult had been directed at Islam, it is true that Islamic networks 
mobilised their members most strongly; however, because ‘settler’ authorities like CAN also 
denounced the cartoons, mobilisation included Christians. Brokerage occurred across the 
‘native’-‘settler’ divide rather than within both categories, de-emphasising inter-group 
difference. Partly because of this, the demonstration against the insulting cartoons failed to 
create an opportunity for violence. A second reason for this lack of opportunity is the fact that 
the demonstration was organised by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a ‘Shia’ group 
in Sunni-dominated Kano. The IMN is more strictly organised than other Islamic 
organisations and therefore not open to ‘hijacking’: 
“they put on their black dress, particularly the women put on their hijab. The men 
have a way of showing their different identity, so if you are not a member you 
don’t join the group. So nobody can hijack the demonstration.”103 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
insulting the Prophet is insulting God. It is therefore more convincing that violence depends on the dominant 
interpretation that frames it, rather than the ‘objective’ nature of the trigger. If a triggering event is not 
interpreted in terms of a dominant social conflict, non-violent collective action become possible. 
Figure 5.1: The IMN During Their Annual Ashura Procession in Kano 
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The third, and perhaps more crucial, factor that explains the lack of opportunity for 
violence was the preventive action by the federal security forces. Apart from public appeals 
promoting the boycott and denouncing violence, the police and army were mobilised in 
advance of the demonstration in order to prevent violent ‘hijacking’ to occur. This pro-active 
approach was possible because the competition between Governor Shekarau and President 
Obasanjo had ended in the threat of the President to declare a state of emergency, thus 
effectively ending the rule of the incumbent Governor, in any state where renewed violence 
would erupt104 - the structural opportunity of state fragmentation had thus been removed.  
 
5.4 Conclusion: Interpreting Violence 
In conclusion, violent riots and non-violent protests are forms of collective action, dependent 
on justifications, mobilisation, and opportunities. The difference between 2004 crisis and the 
non-violent protests of 2006 lies mainly in the discourse used to interpret the triggering 
events, construct justifications, and initiate network-based mobilisation. The Yelwa killings – 
framed in terms of the dominant social conflict between Christian ‘settlers’ and Muslim 
‘natives’ – activated exclusionary identity boundaries, brought up historical grievances as 
justifications, and stimulated intra-group mobilisation. The Danish cartoons on the other hand, 
were interpreted in a framework of secular Denmark against the global Muslim community, 
leading to inclusive justifications and mobilisation for non-violent retaliatory boycotts. 
Contrary to Varshney’s argument, this was not only due to the increased ‘interethnic’ 
institutional integration of traditional and ethnic leaders, but mostly to Christian and Muslim 
leaders, in conjunction with formal authorities and private entrepreneurs. Formal authorities, 
absent from Varshney’s analysis, had an additional important role in creating the opportunity 
for violence in 2004, through internal fragmentation and the in-action of its security services, 
                                                                                                                                                   
103 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit. 
104 Dr Haruna Wakili, op. cit 
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and, further, preventing it in 2006 through the presence of security services during the 
demonstrations.  
 In the violent riot, religious authorities were thus crucial in forming the interpretation 
of the Yelwa killings, or constructing the legitimating discursive structure for the violent riot. 
Through preaching and other public appearances, Islamic leaders related the crisis in Plateau 
to social conflict in Kano, creating a justification for retaliation in terms of the ‘native’-
‘settler’ divide. Partly as a result, mobilisation occurred through networks around mosques, 
while the Ulama brokered across Islamic sects. Although religious and traditional authorities 
had a symbolic function of ‘calming the public’ during the violence, the physical intervention 
of security forces was necessary to enforce this calm. In the cartoon crisis, informal 
authorities affected the non-violent escalation through structural improvements in ‘native’-
‘settler’ constructions and through the development of an inclusive non-violent discourse on 
the cartoons. Religious leaders and traditional rulers constructed Denmark as the common 
enemy and mobilised people across the ‘native’-‘settler’ divide. Lastly, traditional and ethnic 
leaders had a crucial impact on the escalation process through their constructive reaction to 






6  CONCLUSION: INFORMAL AUTHORITIES AND THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
Addressing the problem of social conflict and violence in Kano, this thesis has helped identify 
and explain the roles of informal authorities in the process of conflict resolution. This 
conclusion draws the general arguments together and analyses the role of informal authorities 
in the (de)construction of social conflict and the management of escalation processes. The 
final section will spell out some of the limitations of this analysis and suggest implications 
and avenues for further research. 
 
6.1 ‘Natives’ and ‘Settlers’: the Social Construction of Conflict and Violence in Kano 
Theoretically, conflict and violence are socially constructed. Root cause theories of conflict 
suggest there are ‘objective’ factors, such as horizontal inequalities, resource scarcity, or a 
zero-sum political culture, that cause conflict in society. Although the effect of such factors is 
not denied here, they can only influence action if they are translated into meaningful social 
constructions that shape people’s perceptions and attitudes. Chapter 2 has proposed social 
identities as the vehicle of this construction process. Social conflict thus exists through 
specific forms of social identities, referred to as ‘exclusionary identities’, which are 
constructed in a dynamic historical process affected by ‘root causes’ of conflict. Societies 
contain multiple social conflicts, but, due to specific historical circumstances, some of these 
conflicts can dominate or even monopolise popular discourse and imagination at specific 
points in time. Collective violence, as a particular form of conflict escalation, can occur if 
there are structural or temporal opportunities, and if its justifying discourse and mobilisation 
patterns overlap with the grievances and cleavages of a dominant social conflict.  
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 This theoretical framework was applied to the case of Kano, shown to harbour a 
dominant social conflict between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. These categories are composed of 
ethnicity, religion, class, and legal indigeneity, and, although the difference between them is 
often imagined as a dichotomy, there are many distinctions and levels of integration within 
them. In pre-colonial times, this diversity was recognised and the category of ‘native’ was 
more inclusive, allowing the integration of ‘settlers’ into its community. Conservative power 
politics and strict social segregation enforced by indirect rule, combined with the increasing 
economic migration from the south, hardened these boundaries in the colonial period. This 
trend was continued after independence, when ethno-regional politics and intensified religious 
competition increased tensions within the Muslim community and subsequently between the 
‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. The latter tensions were exacerbated from the early 1980s, 
through economic crisis, population pressures, corrupt and zero-sum politics, and the 
introduction of Sharia and ‘legal indigeneity’. 
 The escalation processes of the Yelwa crisis in 2004 and the Danish cartoons of 2006 
were used in a comparative case-study to identify the factors that explain the variability in 
violence between these two cases. Both were escalatory reactions to external events, but the 
main difference was how killings in Yelwa in May 2004 were interpreted in terms of the 
conflict between Muslims and Christians in Kano, while the insulting cartoons in 2006 were 
framed in terms of Islam against ‘ungodly’ Denmark. Due to this difference in interpretation 
of the trigger, the discourses that justified escalatory action and mobilised people were also 
different. In 2004, the discourse of ‘Christians-versus-Muslims’ led to justification and 
mobilisation on either side of the ‘native’-‘settler’ cleavage, thus activating deeply felt 
grievances that allowed for violence. In contrast, the ‘Islam-against-Denmark’ discourse, 
rather than activating the exclusionary identities and underlying grievances of the ‘native’-
‘settler’ conflict, brought ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ together in a common, non-violent cause. 
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Violence thus depends on the dominant discourse that frames a triggering event. In addition to 
the impact of the discourse employed, the opportunities for violence were different in the two 
cases: while tensions between the President and Governor Shekarau in 2004 led to a minimal 
police presence in a volatile situation, preventive measures and a significant police presence 
during the 2006 demonstrations are likely to have worked as a deterrent for Yandaba and 
other specialists in violence.  
 
6.2 ‘Authoritative Voices’: Informal Authorities and Conflict Resolution in Kano 
Conflict resolution was defined as the transformation of violent conflict processes into non-
violent, constructive ones. The purpose of social conflict resolution is therefore the 
reconstruction of exclusionary identities into inclusive ones and ‘de-constructing’ the social 
conflict and causes of violence. It was argued in chapter 2 that this conception of conflict 
resolution includes two different types of action, conflict settlement and conflict 
transformation. Based on this analysis of Kano, however, conflict resolution can be argued to 
comprise actions on three different levels: ‘objective’ peacebuilding, ‘discursive’ peace-
building, and the constructive management of conflict escalation.  
Firstly, ‘objective’ peacebuilding denotes structural peacebuilding measures that aim 
to eliminate the ‘root causes’, inequalities, and social injustices that are the basis for 
exclusionary identities. Secondly, ‘discursive’ peacebuilding comprises actions that re-frame 
and re-interpret social reality in order to reconstruct exclusionary identity structures without 
necessarily affecting ‘objective’ causes of conflict. ‘Discursive’ peacebuilding alters 
perceptions and attitudes by enacting and emphasising similarities rather than difference. 
Thirdly, conflict resolution is the constructive management of escalation processes, or the 
settlement of disputes, for example through mediation and arbitration, inclusive 
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interpretations of triggering events, non-sectarian mobilisation patterns, preventing 
opportunities for violence, and promoting non-violent alternatives to violent action.  
 
  
Although these levels are presented here as sequential and mutually exclusive, in 
reality conflict resolution actions have effects on multiple levels. For example, the non-violent 
resolution of the cartoon crisis was a case of successful escalation management, but its 
success also worked as a peacebuilding measure to reinforce an inclusive identity structure. 
The categories are useful, however, to differentiate the roles of informal authorities from 
those of other social actors. Informal authorities, as discussed in chapter 3, have functions 
defined by their moral and spiritual authority, community and institutional links, and 
ambiguous relations to formal authorities. Their roles in peacebuilding are therefore also 
delineated by these factors. In general, changing the ‘objective’ root causes of conflict 

























Figure 6.1: Contingency Model for the 2004 and 2006 Escalations in Kano 
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Traditional authorities and ethnic leaders can affect some of these factors by enhancing their 
mutual integration and through emancipatory advocacy with formal authorities, but the 
authority and capacity to change these factors lies mostly with the state. As the politicised 
nature of religious competition is one cause of the zero-sum nature of Nigerian and Kano 
politics, its depoliticisation would likely reduce conflict. This effect, however, is similarly 
indirect in the sense that religious leaders can only affect politics through other actors, namely 
politicians or voters. 
 While ‘objective’ peacebuilding is dominated by formal authorities, informal 
authorities have a great impact on conflict through their influence on public discourse and 
imagination. In ‘discursive’ peacebuilding, therefore, informal authorities can impact on a 
social conflict by creating or reinforcing discourses and (symbolic) practices affecting identity 
constructions. In Kano, traditional authorities emphasise their representation of the territorial 
community of Kano, including ‘native’ and ‘settler’ categories, by improving links with 
ethnic and community leaders and positioning themselves as ‘fathers’ to all of Kano. 
Symbolic gestures like the Emir’s visit to the Igbo president-general after the 2004 riot, 
although without any ‘direct ‘objective effect, are significant because they are part of the 
construction of a ‘counter-hegemonic discourse’, in this case recognising the Igbo as bona 
fide members of the Kano community.  
Religious leaders have more ambiguous roles because they are an institutional 
expression of the ‘native’-‘settler’ cleavage. National zero-sum competition between Islam 
and Christianity is reflected in attitudes of religious leaders in Kano, which have a detrimental 
effect on identity structures in the city and lead to violent escalations like the 2004 Plateau 
crisis. A re-emphasis on peaceful discourses embedded in both religions, as well as their 
extensive overlap in moral and historical terms, could help to deconstruct the exclusionary 
religious identities. The recent joint statement of the Sultan of Sokoto and the president of 
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CAN, calling for interdenominational prayers for the peaceful progress of the 2007 national 
elections, is a significant step in this direction (Ulayi 2007), as is the success of the Interfaith 
Mediation Centre in Kaduna (Channer 2006). Although ethnic leaders also represent one 
‘side’ of the conflict, their efforts for the emancipation of non-indigenes in both traditional 
and formal institutions position their communities explicitly as part of the territorial Kano 
community, rather than different from Kano ‘natives’. In sum, informal authorities in Kano 
can affect exclusionary social identities mostly through ‘discursive’ peacebuilding, while 
‘objective’ peacebuilding is dominated by formal institutions. 
These two types of conflict resolution, however, only relate to the first stage in the 
contingency model. Figure 6.1 shows the contingency model from chapter 2 adapted to the 
escalation cases discussed in chapter 5. Apart from the stage of ‘negative peace’, or structural 
social conflict, three other stages need to be discussed: escalation, violence, and de-escalation. 
As the escalation processes used in this thesis were both reactions to external events, the first 
role of informal authorities in the escalation stage is interpreting the triggering event and 
providing a legitimate response on the basis of this interpretation. Because religion is the most 
salient identity in Kano and the Yelwa and cartoon crises were seen as religious issues, their 
interpretation fell largely within the moral jurisdiction of Islamic leaders. The discourses 
employed by these religious leaders therefore formed the basis of subsequent patterns of 
justification and mobilisation. Interpretations in the language of local grievances provided 
legitimate room for violence, while inclusive interpretations allowed for non-violent 
alternatives. Mobilisation, however, also depended on the level of brokerage and the networks 
utilised. Traditional rulers, in cooperation with religious and ethnic leaders, can broker 
between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities to mobilise across, rather than within the two 
categories. In order to prevent small-scale disputes from escalating into violence, traditional, 
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ethnic and community leaders can also use their capacity for informal dispute settlement; a 
process enhanced by the creation of inter-authority peace and security committees.  
During collective violence, such as the riot in 2004, the role of informal authorities in 
Kano is largely limited to calling for peace through radio, television and other public 
appearances. As chapter 5 has shown, violent escalation requires coercive intervention in 
order to quell the killing and looting and provide an opportunity for reconciliation and de-
escalation. In the violent stage, therefore, formal authorities dominate conflict resolution 
activities through the security services. During de-escalation, however, informal authorities 
regain their roles in building peace and reconciliation between communities through inclusive 
and non-violent discourses and practices, providing care to hurt communities, identifying 
problems causing the violence, and implementing or lobbying for their solutions.  
It is important to realise that during this last stage of the escalation process, the 
escalation episode in itself has become a historical factor in the construction of identities. The 
way in which communities interpret and learn from it therefore affects their mutual 
relationships. Although it is too early to tell, the non-violent escalation of the cartoon crisis 
seems to suggest that Kano authorities and communities have dealt constructively with the 
aftermath of the Plateau crisis. Similarly, the success of the inclusive and non-violent protest 
in reaction to the Danish cartoons has contributed to the integration of Kano across the 
‘native’-‘settler’ divide. Seeking to demonstrate how informal authorities can contribute to the 
continuation of this trend, this thesis has highlighted the power of their authoritative voices in 
the formation of popular discourse and social identities. 
 
6.3 Limits and Implications of the Research  
These arguments are not incompatible with Varshney’s hypothesis that interethnic 
associations prevent violence from occurring; rather, they highlight the formation of inclusive 
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identity structures and non-violent conflict discourses as some of the mechanisms explaining 
this effect. However, these mechanisms are not dependent on interethnic associations; the 
cartoon crisis showed that religious authorities without institutional, or even everyday, 
connections were a crucial factor in creating the space for non-violent collective protest. 
Moreover, the integration of ethnic leaders into the Emirate and the state government are not 
only examples of interethnic integration, but also of integration of ‘settlers’ into trans-ethnic 
traditional and formal government systems. So, while Varshney highlights informal 
institutional integration as a significant independent variable in the maintenance of ethnic 
peace, I have suggested conflict resolution as an incremental process that aims for the 
‘objective’ and ‘discursive’ integration of ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’ into inclusive identities and 
social institutions; interethnic and inter-religious integration are the aim of conflict resolution, 
rather than its conditions.   
 Obviously, there are many limits and pitfalls to the approach taken in this thesis, some 
of which are important to mention here. First, there are of course strict limitations to the 
generality of the arguments made in this thesis: the arguments and evidence presented are 
valid only for the case of contemporary Kano and can, at best, be used as hypotheses for other 
cases of violent conflict. Second, the research is limited by its specific focus on urban riot 
violence, social conflict, and the role of informal authorities. Further research is necessary 
into the conflict resolution mechanisms for other types of conflict and violence, and the roles 
of actors like the media, formal authorities and NGOs. Third, the concept of identity, 
ubiquitously used in this thesis, is analytically ambiguous and politically laden, so much so 
that some scholars have recently argued for abandoning it altogether (Brubaker 2004: 28-63). 
It has nevertheless been used here because, if used as a well-defined analytical term ‘to think 
with’, it carries more explanatory power than any of its suggested replacements. Fourth, the 
broad concept of conflict resolution used in this thesis is potentially open to the criticism of 
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being too inclusive, comprising any type of societal progress. I have tried, however, to limit 
the term to ‘objective’ and ‘discursive’ processes that are in fact aimed at resolving or 
preventing collective violence in society.  
 In conclusion, this thesis has sought to highlight the importance of including informal 
authorities in analyses of conflict and conflict resolution. In Kano, traditional rulers, religious 
authorities, and ethnic and community leaders are influential social actors. They are 
embedded in the social processes of conflict and escalation, and each have ‘space’ for conflict 
resolution agency. Conflict resolution, like development, is not a matter of technocratically 
‘building the necessary institutions’, such as interethnic civil society associations; it is an 
incremental process of social change, transforming social identities and relationships, and 
depends at least partly on the choices and decisions of informal authorities along the way. 
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Methodological Assumptions and Approach 
This appendix discusses the methodological orientation of this research and some of the issues 
in relation to the research design, data collection and analysis, and research ethics. The 
epistemological assumptions of this research have been strongly influenced by interpretivist 
methodologies. Traditionally, the positivist scientific method assumes an objective reality that 
can be observed independent from and unaffected by the researcher (Bernard 2006: 6). 
Although this may hold for the natural sciences105, human perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviours cannot be explained in reference to objective ‘facts’, but only through interpretive 
understanding – Weber’s ‘Verstehen’ (Bryman 1992: 57). Even if the ‘natural world’ were 
governed by immutable laws, the social world is constructed on normative expectations, 
constructed meanings, and shared understandings (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 12-13). 
Researchers, therefore, need to be critical of their own frame of reference, which influences 
their analysis as well as the research context. They should attempt to do research ‘on the terms 
of the research subjects’, constantly ‘calibrating’ their research tool – the mind – through open 
reflexivity about their assumptions and position (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 14; Scheper-
Hughes 1995: 426).  
As discussed in chapter 1, the main purpose of this research is explorative, refining 
theory and forming new hypotheses about the resolution of violent conflict. Qualitative data 
collection methods were particularly useful because they allowed identifying important 
concepts and relationships in cooperation with the respondents, situating the conflict 
processes in their wider social and historical context, and ‘tracing’ them through detailed 
                                                
105 Interestingly however, recent developments in quantum physics show that even in those disciplines, research 
results are affected by the presence and actions of the researcher.  
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chronological description. In addition, quantitative data collection methods106 were used to 
capture popular perceptions of the salience, nature, and impact of social identities in Kano in 
2006. Although surveys are not suited to analyse social processes interpretively, there are two 
methodological reasons why quantitative methods have been useful. Firstly, in addition to the 
advantages of data triangulation (Bryman 1992: 131-34), the incorporation of quantitative 
data on the identity structure of Kano provides the results with a level of ‘generality’ for the 
city that is difficult to achieve through qualitative data alone. Moreover, the quantification of 
variables allowed for formal significance tests for inter-group differences, corroborating the 
results from the qualitative evidence. Following Bryman (1992) and Ritchie and Lewis 
(2003), qualitative and quantitative data collection methods have thus been used to 
complement and reinforce each other. 
 
2. Case Studies 
This research is designed as a case study of conflict resolution in Kano Metropolis. Defined as 
the “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalised to other events” (George and Bennett 2005: 3), case 
studies look at a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that is of scientific interest. Case 
studies have an historical and sociological component: the research problem can be studied as 
a unique and irreproducible product of historical factors, or as a sociological concept (1992: 
159-62). I have examined social conflict resolution in Kano as both a historical phenomenon 
and analytical category, by situating the exclusionary identity and informal authority 
structures in contemporary Kano in their larger historical contexts.  
Case studies allow researchers to identify relevant variables, focus on deviant cases, 
and explore causal mechanisms (Bradshaw and Wallace 1991: 154; George and Bennett 2005: 
                                                
106 The CRISE Perceptions Survey (PS) was used as a standardised instrument to measure the range of 
perspectives on social identity among ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’. 
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19-23). Although in territorial terms this thesis is based on a single city, both in historical and 
sociological terms this unit contains several observations with considerable variance. 
‘Process-tracing’, a technique of mapping detailed accounts of sequences of events, allows for 
sketching out many observations (i.e. ‘cases’) along a hypothesised causal path. In this 
research, these cases were escalation processes – the 2004 and the economic boycotts of 2006.  
The comparison of violence and non-violence over time is useful from a perspective of 
developing conflict resolution policy. Cross-context comparisons often result in historical or 
contextual explanations of variance, which are difficult to change through conflict resolution 
policy (Varshney 2002: 289-90). In contrast, my analysis shows that, in addition to structural 
measures to transform exclusive identity structures, informal and formal authorities have a 
great potential for non-violent conflict resolution agency, even without strong interethnic 
institutional cooperation. As much of the recent research on riots in the developing world has 
focused on cross-context comparisons (e.g. Horowitz 2002; Tilly 2003; Varshney 2002; 
Wiseman 1986), I hope the comparison over time is a useful contribution to the field.   
There are, of course, weaknesses to the case study approach. It is well-recognised that 
case studies do not allow for high-level generalisations. More importantly, however, there is 
an inherent problem of endogeneity in assessing variability across sequential cases: they are 
not independent, as part of the explanation of the non-violence in 2006 lies in the effects of 
the violence in 2004. However, the effect of past escalatory processes is not pre-determined: 
violence can spawn violence, or peace. It is therefore more useful to include the interpretation 
of past escalations as the first stage of the next escalation process. Lastly, Brass (2003: 418) 
argues that research on riots and political violence should not focus on the level of cities, but 
distinguish between violent and non-violent sub-city communities. I have sought to recognise 




3. Ethics  
In her controversial article on the primacy of the ethical, Scheper-Hughes (1995) passionately 
argues for an integration of ethics into anthropological enquiry. Anthropologists, in her view, 
have the moral duty to become part of the struggle they are documenting and defend the 
oppressed against what the researchers ‘know’ is evil (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 416). Although 
her general argument, that morality is an integral part of social research, and the passion of 
the article deserve credit, the solution of political engagement is problematic and in many 
circumstances dangerous (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 422). Objectivism does not necessarily lead 
to moral relativism. Even Karl Popper argues that “scientific objectivity is not a matter for the 
individual scientist, but rather the social result of mutual criticism” (Popper 1992: 72). 
Objectivity thus lies in the product of continuous criticism and self-reflection and requires 
reflexivity, rather than Scheper-Hughes’ political engagement.  
Reflexivity is also a more ethical solution to the dilemmas of social research than 
‘taking sides’. Scheper-Hughes’ militant anthropology assumes that the ethical solution to the 
problem studied is unambiguously clear to its (Western) social researchers. The complicated 
dangers of this view are illustrated by Hart, who shows that unchallenged Western normative 
distinctions between childhood and adulthood “can be […] obstructive to programmes of 
demobilisation” of child-soldiers (Hart 2006: 8). An example from my field work in Kano is 
the issue of polygamy. In my normative framework, polygamy is a manifestation of 
discrimination against women and should be banned from society. In an orthodox Muslim 
society in economic crisis, however, polygamy can also be considered a morally acceptable 
variation on divorce: women who would be ostracised as divorcees, are looked after and 
retain their social position through the system of polygamy. Participating in the struggle to 
end polygamy would lead to more suffering of women, not less.  
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Both examples illustrate that social research needs to strive for objectivity through 
constant reflexivity and criticism, contrasting ambiguities and contradictions within the 
research population. The ‘outsider status’ of the social scientist, in Scheper-Hughes’ words 
the “chameleon-like ambidexterity of the non-committal anthropologist” (Scheper-Hughes 
1995: 411) does not imply a ‘suspension of morality’, but rather a careful consideration, based 
on systematic research and an open and empathic attitude to all respondents, of what is ethical 
in which situation. Ethical and methodological reflexivity should be part of every step of the 
research process and the sections on data collection, analysis, and future prospects below will 
therefore each address the ethical issues of concern.  
 
4. Data Collection 
The data for this research was collected through 2 months of field work in Kano during the 
summer of 2006. I was affiliated to a local development NGO, the Development Research and 
Project Centre (dRPC), which provided office space and an invaluable wealth of contacts. 
This section will discuss my data collection strategies. 
 
4.1 Qualitative Data Collection 
The qualitative data consists of three main types: 28 unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews, a group discussion of my initial research results and many informal conversations; 
newspaper archives from May-July 2004 and February and March 2006; and ethnographic 
maps of the violent ‘hotspots’ in the metropolitan area (Sharada, Ja’en and Dorayi; the 
borders of Sabon Gari; and Dakata, Ranguza, and other parts of Brigade). The mapping 
exercises were done with a guide from the area, either from a car or on foot. Although Nigeria 
has a wide range of daily newspapers and the most productive press community in the African 
continent (Olutokun 2001: 1), the quality and objectivity of much of its reporting is dubitable. 
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To address this problem, where possible I have used newspapers from different parts of the 
country reporting on the same event. The interviews form the main qualitative source of 
primary data and their sampling frame, designed to capture the variability between indigene 
and non-indigene views, is depicted in table A.1.  
 
Table A.1: Sampling Frame Interviews 




Leaders Youths NGOs 
Key 
informants 
Indigenes 1 2 1 2 5 4 
Non-Indigenes  2 2 1 5 4 
 
Although the table shows a good numerical distribution, several potential biases need 
to be detailed here. First, there is a bias towards NGOs, which is due to the fact that these 
NGOs offered a wealth of knowledge and that access to them was easy through the dRPC. 
However, conflict resolution NGOs in Kano have a particular view of conflict and conflict 
resolution, which coloured much of their responses in the interviews107. A second, perhaps 
more damaging bias is the lack of female interviewees: out of the 28, only 3 interviewees 
were female108. This is largely due to difficulties of interviewing Hausa Muslim women as a 
male researcher, but also to the male dominance in spheres of authority and youth groups in 
Kano. This is part of the reason why the gender dimension, in hindsight of great importance in 
a male-dominated Hausa Muslim society, is largely ignored in my analysis of social conflict.  
A third bias is the lack of formal authorities in the sample. Although the topic of the 
research is the role of informal authorities, one of its results is that formal and informal 
authorities are linked. This bias was due to time-constraints and the fact that I was advised 
that it was risky, as a white, young foreigner, to interview the police and politicians critically 
about such a political topic. All three biases indicate a general weakness in the research 
                                                
107 See section 3.5. 
108 One religious leader and two NGO workers. 
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design, namely the inherent contradiction of an exploratory research question and 
methodology in such a limited timeframe. Exploratory research requires time to look around, 
find the important research concepts and respondents, and adjust sampling frameworks and 
methodology. Two months is ultimately a bit short for such a task. 
 In planning the interviews, my aim was to begin with unstructured interviews to 
discover the concepts and themes of importance to my analysis and then use them to develop 
more structured interview schedules in the later weeks of the research. My initial respondents 
were therefore key informers, including academic specialists and NGO experts, and the topic 
lists used for these interviews included questions on the ‘cultural domains’ of conflict and 
violence, their causes, actors, dynamics, and the cases of 2004 and 2006. More structured 
interviews were held with the informal authorities, because this made their answers more 
comparable. The interviews, as well as other social interactions, were strongly influenced by 
my position. My status as ‘outsider’ in religious, skin colour, language, age, educational, and 
socio-economic terms affected access to respondents, my relations to respondents and our 
mutual interpretations of each other’s words and purposes. My religious self-classification as 
‘inspired by Christian values’ placed me firmly in the Nigerian category of Christians; I thus 
became part of the exclusive framework of religious identities.  
During interviews, however, religion did not seem to be the most influential aspect of 
my position; I felt that age, skin colour, and education were more important. Age matters 
because in Nigeria authority increases with age. My youth – according to many 24 years is 
still a boy – was sometimes difficult to combine with my role as interviewer, as this requires 
certain authority as an ‘expert’. I sometimes tried to reposition myself by making the 
interview setting more formal or referring to Oxford University; more often, however, my 
youth was an advantage because it allowed me to ask obvious questions and made people at 
ease, regardless of my background. Similarly, many of my respondents assumed cultural 
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naivety, which led them to have different expectations from me than from Nigerian 
researchers. For example, I was not expected to wear formal northern dress, even to the most 
formal meetings, and when interviewing Islamic and traditional leaders, they readily shook 
my hand even though I tried to behave in the ‘Nigerian way’. Language also affected my 
access to respondents. As I did not speak any Nigerian language, it was difficult to 
communicate with people in the street or the markets.  
 In many ways, it is ethically problematic for a privileged student at Oxford to travel to 
a poor region and ask local people to help him with his research. Conflict and violence are 
sensitive topics and the issues of informed consent, anonymity, and compensation were 
therefore crucial. Interestingly, only once did an interview stagnate because the respondent 
was unwilling to talk about his experiences during the violence of 2004. More often, however, 
did people request anonymity in exchange for their information; their names have been coded 
and quoted as anonymous throughout the thesis. With regard to compensation, I have tried to 
assess on a case-by-case basis what compensation would be appropriate, paying only the 
youths and research assistants. I also organised a small seminar on the last day of my stay in 
Kano, which was attended by 14 respondents and otherwise interested parties and where I 
presented my initial findings and ideas. This seminar served both as a validity check for my 
ideas and as a way of feeding the most important information back to the people who helped 
me to get it.  
 
4.2 Quantitative Data Collection 
The quantitative data was collected through an adapted version of the CRISE PS, which was 
designed as an instrument to test hypotheses pertaining to the link between horizontal 
inequalities and violent conflict (e.g. Langer et al. 2007; Stewart 2001). It is built on the 
theory that perceptions determine and explain human behaviour, therefore measuring 
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respondents’ perceptions about their social identities, other groups in society, their relative 
positions of status, and the legitimacy of different forms of political action. The PS also 
provides baseline statistics about the sample population, such as religion, ethnicity, age, 
gender, and occupation. The PS was purposefully designed to allow some measure of 
flexibility in the identity categories that it refers to, both through open-ended questions and 
adaptation of questions to local circumstances.  
 Three aspects need to be discussed with regard to quantitative data collection: the 
research population and sampling strategies; working with research assistants; and practical 
issues pertaining to the efficiency of the process and the quality of the data. This research 
used multi-stage sampling, meaning that a certain number of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) 
were selected with a probability proportional to size (PPS), from which a fixed number of 
households was chosen randomly to participate in the survey. Even though such a method 
increases the sampling error, which is referred to as the cluster effect, it was necessary 
because of financial and time constraints (Grosh 1996: 55-59). The research population was 
the population of Kano; to ensure sufficient sample sizes of both ‘native’ and ‘settler’ 
perceptions, the sampling frame was stratified for these “analytical domains” (Grosh 1996: 
58-59). Three neighbourhoods in Kano were selected to represent the variability on the 
‘native’-‘settler’ scale: Kano City, homogeneous indigenous; Sabon Gari, homogenous non-
indigenous; and Brigade, with a heterogeneous population109. Within this stratified sampling 
frame, the following conditions were set for the composition of the sample: (i) a 50/50 gender 
balance in each PSU; (ii) 10 randomly selected households in each PSU; and (iii) an equal 
number of randomly selected PSUs in each stratum. The total sample size was set on 210 
households, as a compromise between financial and time constraints and a maximum 
precision; the results of Kano City and Sabon Gari comprise 140 households. 
                                                
109 Due to technical problems with the Brigade data, this thesis only uses data from Kano City and Sabon Gari. 
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 Having set these conditions, the division of neighbourhoods into PSUs required some 
improvisation. Historically, Kano is divided into wards, but while a list of such wards existed 
for Kano City, neither Sabon Gari nor Brigade had sufficiently small or clearly bounded 
wards to be used as PSUs. Instead, therefore, satellite maps from Google Earth were used to 
demarcate areas that functioned as PSUs110. A second problem arose from the random 
selection of PSUs, because PPS selection requires accurate population statistics for each PSU 
(Grosh 1996: 216). Since the last population survey was over 15 years old and contested, 
these were hard to find. Only Kano City had a village listing from 1994, with population 
statistics for its wards (Department of Planning 1994). PSUs in Kano City were therefore 
selected with PPS; PSUs in the other two strata were selected at random. Within the PSUs, 
households were selected through a random walking pattern. From each household, a male or 
female interviewee was randomly selected; there were stringent rules for household 
substitution. The specific sampling procedures, derived from earlier CRISE PS exercises, 
were explained to the research assistants in a training session, which also gave them the 
opportunity to standardise their translations of the English questionnaire into Nigerian 
languages and practice. Remuneration was made conditional on fulfilling the walking patterns 
and selection procedures.  
The problems in the data collection stage of the quantitative methods were mainly 
related to the logistics of managing a research team. Because of the short time frame, I 
employed eight research assistants to help me with the collection of the PS data. Six of them, 
all students and young professionals, were hired to do the survey, whilst the other two agreed 
to help me manage the process. The survey assistants were divided in teams of two and each 
team was assigned the stratum where they lived. The greatest problem during this stage was 
the fact that I could neither work with them nor watch them while they were working, in order 
                                                
110 See appendix C. 
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to ensure my safety and the willingness of respondents to cooperate. To ensure reliability of 
the data, I used four different methods: (i) checking the coding of each questionnaire after the 
research assistants handed them in at the end of each working day; (ii) collecting sketches of 
their walking patterns; (iii) checking back 2 randomly selected interviews for each assistant; 
and (iv) having the ‘managing’ research assistants work alongside them for a couple of 
interviews. On the whole, the reliability checks were effective because one of the two 
‘managing’ research assistants was an older and well-respected researcher.  
The most important ethical considerations at this stage were protecting the anonymity 
of the respondents and compensating the research assistants fairly. Although names and house 
addresses were recorded for sampling purposes, this data was not entered into the dataset. The 
compensation for the research assistants consisted of a financial remuneration per 
questionnaire or per day, and a letter of recommendation stating their activities and the 
purpose of the research.  
 
5. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Although fieldwork and data collection in Kano were challenging, data analysis and write up 
was the most difficult stage of this thesis project. The combination of interpreting texts and 
numbers ‘extracted’ from a distant and still relatively strange context, the drive to do justice 
to all the complexities and contradictions in the data, and the inherent ethical tension between 
what is a useful final product for them and for me complicated the analysis (Wilson 1992: 
193-94). This section discusses the approaches I took and some of the problems they created. 
 
5.1 Qualitative Data 
Because the research purpose of the thesis was explorative, my qualitative analysis borrowed 
techniques and concepts from the grounded theory approach. The analysis started by ‘in vivo’ 
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coding of the interviews and the construction of sensitising concepts on the basis of these 
codes (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 203), using the NVIVO computer programme. However, in 
formal terms there was not sufficiently ‘thick’ data for a full grounded theory analysis; the 
stage of ‘saturation’ could not really be reached. Therefore, as the analysis progressed I 
increasingly compared and contrasted these codes and sensitising concepts with some of the 
theoretical concepts in conflict resolution and social identity theory. In a way, theoretical 
insights were used to strengthen the results found in the data. 
 This approach, however, is problematic because it reduces the importance of the 
voices of the respondents. In other words, the ‘voice’ of theory came to affect and shape my 
interpretations of the voices of my respondents and may to some extent have prevented me 
from analysing adequately ‘on the terms’ of my respondents. This raised the crucial question 
of whether or not my respondents would agree with my interpretations. Although this is a 
matter of judgment, there may always be respondents who do not feel their opinion and 
contributions are adequately recognised in an academic analysis. My mental benchmark of 
assessing if an argument was analytically grounded was whether or not I would feel confident 
justifying my position to any of the respondents. If not, I felt I had to adjust my view. 
These problems are also closely related to the ethical challenges of analysing 
fieldwork data from developing countries, most importantly to the tension between the 
necessity to develop academically relevant ideas and the drive to provide a socially relevant 
analysis. Although I do not think these tensions can be resolved, being aware of them has 
helped me to keep the analysis grounded in the data, for example by using verbatim quotes 
from the interviews where possible. Conscientious and evidence-based analysis is one part of 
the solution to the ethical research dilemmas; dissemination of the results is another. I will 
therefore also rewrite the basic results of my research into a short paper that will be available 
online to interested parties in Kano.  
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5.2 Quantitative Data 
The first challenge in the analysis of the quantitative data was the process of cleaning up the 
data by coding open questions and recoding questions into useful variables. Fortunately, I 
could build on the work and advice of CRISE researchers, who kindly helped me through this 
process. Subsequent analysis of the quantitative data consisted of simple formal significance 
tests, most notably χ2 and t-tests. χ2 was used to test for independence between the variables 
and ‘neighbourhood’, while the t-test was used to test for differences between the means of 
the two groups within individual categories (Agresti and Finlay 1997: 184, 254-56). The 
results of these tests have been reported in appendix B. 
 An important problem with the analysis of my quantitative data was the lack of 
precision due to the small sample size. Precision, a measure of the reproducibility of the data 
from the sample, depends on sample size in the formula ( )2
2 196.1
d
PPDEFFN −⋅⋅=  , where 
N is the sample size; DEFF the design effect, a measure of the loss of variability due to using 
clustered sampling; P the estimated prevalence; 1.96 the Z-value for 95% confidence limits; 
and d the precision of the sample (Woodruff 2002). A sample size of 140, with P = 0.25 and 
DEFF = 1.45 leads to a precision of 9%; in terms of analysis, this means that only inter-group 
differences larger than 9% are likely to be meaningful; anything below 9% can be caused by 
the sampling error111.  
 Another problem with the interpretation of the quantitative data is to what extent the 
data is thought to represent the entire spectrum of perceptions in Kano. Although the sampling 
included equal numbers of indigenes and non-indigenes, they were only selected from two 
neighbourhoods. At best, therefore, the data is statistically representative of Kano City and 
Sabon Gari. Based on the qualitative evidence, I can argue that these neighbourhoods are in 
fact the poles of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ identities and the variance of perceptions between the 
                                                
111 These estimates of P and DEFF are based on previous results from other PS data. 
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two communities captures much of the variance between Kano ‘natives’ and southern 
‘settlers’ in general. The data does not, however, represent the more ambiguous and complex 
groups such as the northern non-indigenes.  
 
6. Where Do We Go From Here? 
This appendix has sought to justify the research design and methodological approach taken in 
this research, but has also indicated many substantial problems along the way. In further 
research on this topic, I would focus more on ethnographic data and follow-up interviews with 
survey respondents in order to contextualise the quantitative data more effectively. Ideally, a 
research like this should be split up in two phases: an initial phase of exploratory, qualitative 
methods through which the basic theoretical framework can be established; after which a 
quantitative test can be developed and used to test some of the initial hypotheses in a second 
phase of fieldwork.  
 Future research based on this thesis can continue in two main ways. It can use some of 
the results and conclusions from this research, such as the link between the discourse of 
informal authorities and violent escalation, and test these results quantitatively in other 
contexts. Alternatively, it could use a similar explorative methodological and theoretical 
framework to study other cases of violent and non-violent conflict escalation and compare 
those results to the ones presented in this thesis. In ethical terms, the discussion above has 
mostly highlighted the risks and problems connected to fieldwork in Kano. Perhaps it is 
therefore useful to emphasise that research into conflict resolution also provides constructive 
opportunities. The dissemination of the research results and feed-back of the main conclusions 
to the research population is therefore the final phase of the research, which hopefully leads to 
renewed attention for and discussion on the potential for non-violent conflict resolution. 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES OF SIGNIFICANCE TESTS FIGURES 4.1-4.7 
All χ2 – tests were significant at the 0.05 level; the H0 of independence between variables can 
therefore be rejected for figures 4.1 to 4.7. 
 
Table B.1: t-Test Results for Figure 4.1 
  








.86 .23 .63*** 
Religion 
(Muslim/Christian) .07 .89 -.82*** 
Yoruba .00 .21 .21*** 
Igbo .00 .53 .53*** 
Hausa Fulani .89 .01 -.88*** 
Northern .06 .04 -.02 
Southern .06 .21 .15** 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 
*:  Significant at .10 level 
 
Table B.2: t-Test Results for Figure 4.2 
 





Religion .33 .31 -.02 
Gender .32 .07 -.25*** 
Ethnicity .18 .18 .00 
Nationality .09 .08 -.01 
Neighbourhood .03 .10 .07*** 
State .02 .00 -.02 
Occupation .02 .23 .21*** 
Region .01 .01 .00 
Ideology .01 .01 .00 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 
*:  Significant at .10 level 
 
Table B.3: t-Test Results for Figure 4.3 
 





Objection (no/yes) .58 .35 -.23*** 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 




Table B.4: t-Test Results for Figure 4.4 
 





All but own religion .42 .00 -.42*** 
All but own ethnicity .14 .33 .19** 
Aversion Kanuri .12 .00 -.12** 
Aversion Yoruba .08 .16 .08 
Aversion Hausa .08 .42 .34*** 
Aversion Christians .05 .00 -.05 
Aversion Nupe .05 .00 -.05 
Aversion Traditional .03 .00 -.03 
Aversion Igbo .02 .07 .05 
Aversion nationality .00 .02 .02 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 
*:  Significant at .10 level 
 
Table B.5: t-Test Results for Figure 4.5 
 





Islam or non-formal .22 .01 -.21*** 
Primary school .09 .18 .09 
Secondary school .51 .49 -.02 
Tertiary qualification .18 .32 .14* 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 
*:  Significant at .10 level 
 
Table B.6: t-Test Results for Figure 4.6 
 





Agricultural .03 .00 -.03 
Small private .18 .44 .26*** 
Large private .02 .11 .09** 
Public .13 .00 -.13*** 
Unemployed .15 .06 -.09 
Working in the home .26 .13 -.13* 
Student .24 .27 .03 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 
*:  Significant at .10 level 
 
Table B.7: t-Test Results for Figure 4.7 
 





0-2 .19 .13 -.06 
3-5 .54 .75 .21*** 
6-7 .27 .12 -.15** 
***: Significant at .001 level 
**: Significant at .05 level 
*:  Significant at .10 level 
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Map 2: Nigeria 
 
Source: US Central Intelligence Agency (1993) 
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Map 3: Satellite Image of Kano Metropolis 






































Map 4: Satellite Image of Sabon Gari  
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